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**CHAIN REACTION:
AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

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CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of Transmittal	v
Executive Summary	vii
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Historical Lessons on Nuclear “Roll Forward” and “Rollback”	4
Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia	9
The Worst Case Scenario	9
Saudi Perceptions of Iran and the Iranian Nuclear Program	10
The Saudi Nuclear Energy Program	15
Will the Saudi Seek a Nuclear Weapon?	16
Policy Considerations	21
Chapter 4: Egypt	25
Egypt’s Nuclear Power Program: Past and Present	25
Egypt and Iran	27
Egypt and Nuclear Weapons	28
The Two Wild Cards	30
Policy Considerations	32
Chapter 5: Turkey	35
Major Irritants in the United States-Turkey Relationship	36
Turkey and NATO	39
Turkey and Nuclear Weapons	40
Policy Considerations	41
Appendix 1: Status of Relevant Nuclear Agreements	45
Appendix 2: U.S. Non-Immigrant Visas Issued in Saudi Arabia	46
Appendix 3: U.S. Non-Immigrant Visas Issued to Egyptian, Saudi, and Turk- ish Nationals	47
Appendix 4: Map of the Middle East	48
Appendix 5: Map of Arabian Peninsula and Vicinity	49

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

FEBRUARY 27, 2008.

DEAR COLLEAGUES: In July of 2007, I directed my Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member for the Middle East, Bradley Bowman, to undertake an examination of the factors that could motivate states of the Middle East to acquire nuclear weapons.

Between July and December 2007, Mr. Bowman conducted research and interviewed hundreds of individuals in Washington DC, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to pursuing the question regarding “nuclear drivers” in the Middle East, he also focused specifically on the regional ramifications if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons.

The resulting staff report contains policy considerations that represent the independent judgments of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of members of the committee. However, in the wake of the December 2007 NIE and in light of recent announcements by Arab states regarding nuclear energy, the observations and analyses presented here are timely. They are offered as one contribution in the effort to understand Middle East politics and the challenges the U.S. will confront going forward.

Sincerely,

RICHARD G. LUGAR,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Foreign Relations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Iran's nuclear program remains one of the most serious threats to U.S. interests and Middle East peace, despite the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) conclusion that "Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003." Iran continues to enrich uranium—the most difficult component of a nuclear weapons program—and continues to conduct work that could contribute to nuclear weapons development. As the NIE states, Iran now possesses the "scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so." Consequently, the NIE judges "with moderate confidence" that Iran will have enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to produce a nuclear weapon by 2010–2015. Furthermore, because the motivations inspiring the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons remain unaddressed, Iran remains unlikely to fully abandon its long-term drive to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. If in fact Iran halted the other aspects of its nuclear weapons program in 2003, this action almost certainly represents a tactical pause rather than a strategic change of course. In short, Iran now possesses the means as well as the motivation to develop nuclear weapons. Consequently, it is entirely possible that the United States could confront a nuclear-armed or nuclear weapons capable Iran in the next decade.

If such an undesirable scenario were to occur in the next decade, despite the international community's best efforts, the U.S. must not be caught unprepared. U.S. decision-makers must seek to understand the regional dynamics that would accompany an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and be ready to implement policies to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons capability would dramatically shift the balance of power among Iran and its three most powerful neighbors—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This shift in the balance of power could spark a regional nuclear arms race as Iran's neighbors seek to redress the new power imbalance. This raises important questions: How are these three countries currently responding to the Iranian nuclear program? How would Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara respond if Tehran were to cross the nuclear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons? Would they pursue nuclear weapons of their own? What factors would influence their decisions? What can the U.S. do now and over the coming years to discourage these countries from pursuing a nuclear weapon of their own?

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contain staff's findings related to these questions. Each chapter touches on the respective country's relationship with Iran and the United States, identifies the incentives and disincentives that would influence the state's response to a nu-

clear-armed Iran, and provides policy considerations that would reduce the chances the state would respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Based on 5 months of research and interviews with hundreds of officials and scholars in the United States and seven Middle Eastern countries, this report comes to the following conclusions for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey:

SAUDI ARABIA (CHAPTER 3)

The development of a Saudi nuclear weapon represents one of the most serious and most likely consequences of an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, it will place tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit. The only factor that would likely dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon would be a restored United States-Saudi bilateral relationship and a repaired Saudi perception regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If the United States does not take deliberate actions in the coming years to achieve both of these objectives, an Iranian bomb will almost certainly lead to a Saudi bomb.

The vast majority of individuals interviewed believe that Saudi Arabia represents the country most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb. Significant disagreement among many parties exists regarding the Saudi's final decision, as well as their capability to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, high-level U.S. diplomats in Riyadh with excellent access to Saudi decision-makers expressed little doubt about the Saudi response. These diplomats repeatedly emphasized that an Iranian nuclear weapon frightens the Saudis "to their core" and would compel the Saudis to seek nuclear weapons.

Those who believe Saudi Arabia would not respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons by pursuing a weapon of its own usually emphasize one of three arguments. The first suggests the value the Saudis place on their relationship with the United States would dissuade them from taking a nuclear decision that would severely damage their most important bilateral relationship. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States. The United States has served as Saudi Arabia's most important security guarantor since 1945. However, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States because the United States has served Saudi Arabia's interests. If Saudi Arabia comes to believe the United States cannot or will not protect the Kingdom and its core interests, the Saudi regime will not hesitate to develop the independent means to deter its enemies. If the United States does not take assertive steps now to restore Saudi faith in the U.S. security guarantee, this will increase the likelihood that the Saudis will respond to a perceived decline in the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the emergence of an Iranian nuclear threat by pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent.

The second argument frequently cited relates to the character of the regime. Some argue the Saudi regime is too conservative, too timid to take such a bold and controversial step. However, the Saudi regime's undoubtedly conservative and occasionally timid approach to foreign relations has not kept Saudi Arabia from taking covert and controversial measures in the past in order to protect

its interests. The Saudi acquisition of 50–60 CSS-2 missiles, 10–15 mobile launchers, and technical support from China at a cost of about \$3 to \$3.5 billion in the late 1980s provides an example. These missiles, which represent some of the longest-range missiles in the world, were acquired by the Saudis after the U.S. decision not to sell the Saudis surface-to-surface missiles. This Saudi move—apparently conducted without the knowledge of Israel or the United States—reflected anything but a conservative or timid approach. While the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a much greater challenge to the bilateral relationship, the CSS-2 affair demonstrates that in order to ensure its own security, Saudi Arabia will not hesitate to aggressively bypass or risk alienating the United States in order to protect Saudi interests.

The third argument often cited relates to Saudi Arabia's nuclear technology capabilities. Saudi Arabia lacks the human expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapons program on its own. Experts consistently describe Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure and know how as far inferior to Egypt and Turkey. However, many individuals emphasize that the U.S. should not underestimate Saudi Arabia's ability to buy the technology required. Many scholars and U.S. diplomats believe Saudi Arabia may have some sort of formal or informal understanding with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have common interests and complementary assets. Pakistan has a nuclear capability and limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no nuclear capability and virtually unlimited money. While no solid evidence exists to confirm the formalization of such an agreement, some circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement or "understanding" may exist.

EGYPT (CHAPTER 4)

An Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would ignite a heated debate in Cairo as to whether Egypt should pursue nuclear weapons. Although such a development in Iran would hasten Egypt's nuclear energy efforts, in the view of almost all of those interviewed, Egypt would most likely choose not to respond by pursuing its own nuclear weapons. The potential Israeli response and the impact on Egypt's relations with the United States represent the most important reasons. Two pillars undergird Egyptian national security strategy: peace with Israel and a security partnership with the United States. While both Israel and America remain very unpopular with the Egyptian people, the Egyptian regime relies on peace with Israel and aid from the United States to maintain its security and its power. An Egyptian pursuit of nuclear weapons would destabilize—if not topple—the Israeli and American pillars of Egypt's national security strategy. Egyptian leaders considering a pursuit of nuclear weapons would need to consider the Israeli response. If the past is any indication, there is no reason to believe a new Egyptian nuclear weapons program would evade Israeli attention. Such an Egyptian program and the Israeli response could reignite open hostility between the two states. Additionally, an Egyptian nuclear weapons program could severely damage the bilateral relationship between Egypt and the United States. Egypt leans heavily on U.S. aid, as well as U.S. military assistance, and

an Egyptian nuclear weapons program would endanger both. Therefore, as long as peace with Israel and a security relationship with the United States remain in Egypt's interest, the disincentives for an Egyptian nuclear weapons program appear to outweigh the incentives.

However, two wildcards—the response of Israel and Saudi Arabia to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon—could decisively shape Egypt's response. If Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon in the next few years, this would represent a major strategic and political shock to Israel. As a result, the Israeli Government would face tremendous domestic political pressure to respond in an explicit and bold way. The nature of the Israeli response could prove decisive in shaping Egypt's response to an Iranian bomb. Secondly, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear weapon would substantially shift Egypt's cost-benefit analysis regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Egyptians see themselves as the natural leaders of the Arab world, based largely on Egypt's proud history, its dominance of Arab culture and media, its large population, and its relative military prowess. However, staff frequently encountered a feeling among Egyptian officials and scholars that Egypt's leadership role has deteriorated in recent years. Egyptians view Saudi Arabia as the country attempting to replace Egypt as the leader of the Arab world. While Saudi Arabia has only one-third of Egypt's population, Saudi Arabia's oil wealth and its role as "guardian of the two holy mosques" give it a unique position from which to challenge Egypt's leadership.

Within this context of competition between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a uniquely threatening challenge to Egypt's self-conception and regional influence. While Egypt would view an Iranian bomb as a negative and disconcerting development, in the end, Iran does not represent an Arab or Sunni power. Thus, despite Tehran's efforts to blur ethnic and religious differences, it is unlikely that Iran will ever be able to unify Sunni Arab powers beneath its leadership. The same cannot be said of the Saudis. The Saudis are Arab and they are predominantly Sunni, and in sharing these two important characteristics with Egypt, a Saudi nuclear bomb would represent a more proximate and more serious threat to Egypt's prestige and national identity. In short, the manner with which Israel and Saudi Arabia respond to the potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons will have a potentially decisive influence on Egypt's decision regarding nuclear weapons.

TURKEY (CHAPTER 5)

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this would also place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit. Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but Turkey believes the centuries of peace and relative stability between the two states and their predecessor empires derive primarily from the rough balance of power between them. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance in Iran's direction. Turkey believes this increased Iranian power would lead to a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy and a marginalization of Turkey. Such a development would

significantly undercut Turkey's desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west. In such a scenario, there would be strong voices in the Turkish General Staff, as well as among ultra-nationalist politicians, arguing for Turkey to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the possibility still exists that Turkey would respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well.

At the same time, there are significant disincentives to a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. First, doing so would severely damage United States-Turkish relations, which represent an essential component of Turkish national security. Second, such a development would endanger Turkey's good standing in NATO, another key component of Turkey's national security. Third, a Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons would seriously undercut any remaining chance of Turkish accession into the European Union. Fourth, powerful popular voices within Turkey would likely oppose a Turkish attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the democratic system in Turkey would enable these popular forces to influence Turkey's decisions on these issues.

Staff believes U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of NATO will serve as the decisive factors in Turkey's decision regarding nuclear weapons. If the bilateral relationship with the United States is poor and Turkey's trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more likely to respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well. However, a fully restored bilateral relationship with the United States and a renewed Turkish trust in NATO provide the best means to discourage a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, staff found evidence of strain in the U.S.-Turkey relations and skepticism regarding the reliability of NATO security assurances for Turkey. Prior to President Bush's meetings with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan on November 5, 2007, Turkish-United States relations were at one of the lowest points in memory. Since this visit, relations between the two countries have begun to rebound, but much work remains. Also, real and perceived delays and failures of NATO in fulfilling its commitments to Turkey in 1991 and 2003 have contributed to a widespread Turkish disenchantment with NATO. If these Turkish perceptions toward the United States and NATO do not significantly improve, an Iranian bomb could lead to a Turkish bomb.

CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In 1984, George Shultz wrote, “It is no exaggeration to say that controlling the spread of nuclear weapons is critical to world peace and, indeed, to human survival. It is a cause that deserves and receives top priority in our foreign policy.” In the years since Secretary Shultz’s observation, the threat posed to the United States by nuclear proliferation has only grown worse. The diffusion of scientific knowledge related to nuclear weapons and reactor technology in the last two decades has dramatically increased the danger to the United States and its interests.¹

A global nuclear energy “renaissance” appears to be underway due in large part to concerns over greenhouse gas emissions that accompany fossil fuel consumption and the inability of oil and natural gas supplies to meet the burgeoning global demand for energy. In the Middle East, these energy dynamics, as well as a desire to match Iran’s nuclear progress, have ignited and renewed widespread interest in nuclear energy. In addition to Iran, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Yemen, have all expressed interest in nuclear energy. While some of these states appear more committed to pursuing nuclear power than others, the growing demand for energy, combined with strategic calculations related to Iran, virtually guarantee that the Middle East of 2025 will be populated by at least 3–4 states engaging in nuclear power generation.²

This growing presence of nuclear energy in the Middle East will exacerbate current global trends in which nuclear materials and technology are becoming increasingly available. Without comprehensive international reform, this increased availability of nuclear materials and technology will reduce the supply-side obstacles to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, thereby shifting the cost-benefit analysis of many states in a dangerous direction. Increasingly, states that seek a nuclear weapons capability will have access to the knowledge and materials necessary to obtain it. This is not to suggest that technical hurdles to the development of nuclear weapons will cease to exist, but only that the proliferation of

¹The author would like to thank the Congressional Research Service generally and Paul Kerr, Christopher Blanchard, and Jeremy Sharp specifically for their research assistance. The author would also like to thank Jay Branegan and Robert Einhorn for their helpful input. However, the views expressed here are the author’s alone.

²For purposes of this report, the Middle East is defined by Egypt in the west, Turkey in the north, Iran in the east, and Yemen in the south. This definition specifically excludes the countries to the west of Egypt (the Maghreb) and countries to the east of Iran (Pakistan and Afghanistan).

nuclear energy technology and know-how will lower these hurdles. For many states, this development will reduce the time and resources required to obtain a nuclear weapons capability.

Since the supply-side obstacles to nuclear weapons proliferation continue to decrease, the international community must place greater emphasis on the demand-side of the issue. In other words, U.S. policy must place a greater emphasis on identifying and addressing the “nuclear drivers” that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons. The international community should continue its efforts to control and regulate nuclear technologies and materials, but must take its efforts further. An effective nuclear nonproliferation strategy must be comprehensive, focusing on both the availability of nuclear materials and technology, as well as the demand for nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, since the end of the cold war, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy has been decidedly one-sided—often neglecting to evaluate the reasons states pursue nuclear weapons. If U.S. policy continues to neglect the “nuclear drivers” that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, U.S. efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East will almost certainly fail.³

Since the advent of nuclear weapons in the last months of World War II, 29 states have pursued nuclear weapons. However, 18 of these states willingly abandoned their programs—a decision often called nuclear “rollback.”⁴ These 18 case studies provide ample evidence that states can be dissuaded from pursuing nuclear weapons when the international community—and often the United States in particular—addresses the state’s motivations behind its quest for nuclear weapons.⁵ The history of nonproliferation does not teach that states eyeing nuclear weapons inevitably get them. Rather, the history teaches that nonproliferation efforts succeed when the United States and the international community help satisfy whatever concerns drove a state to want nuclear weapons in the first place. In other words, if the United States can accurately identify and address the motivations—or “nuclear drivers”—that compel or encourage Middle Eastern states to pursue nuclear weapons, it may be possible to interrupt the nuclear proliferation momentum in the region.

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF AN IRANIAN NUCLEAR BOMB

In light of this global nuclear energy “renaissance” and with the benefit of these historical lessons, this study attempts to identify the ramifications of a potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. More specifically, this report assesses the likelihood that neighbors of Iran would respond to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon by seeking nuclear weapons of their own. Furthermore, this study seeks to identify the steps the U.S. can take now,

³ Gawhat Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East,” the Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies (Winter 2005).

⁴ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,” Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007).

⁵ The countries that have “rolled back” are Norway, Italy, Indonesia, Egypt, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Libya. The Iraqi program was discovered and reversed by force and the Iranian program continues.

as well as in the future if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, to prevent a regional nuclear arms race.

Such a study may seem unnecessary to some in light of the December 2007 NIE, but Iran's nuclear program remains one of the most serious threats to U.S. interests and Middle East peace. Iran continues to enrich uranium—the most difficult component of a nuclear weapons program—and continues to conduct work that could contribute to nuclear weapons development. As the NIE states, Iran now possesses the “scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.” Consequently, the NIE judges “with moderate confidence” that Iran will have enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to produce a nuclear weapon by 2010–2015. Furthermore, because the motivations inspiring the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons remain unaddressed, Iran remains unlikely to fully abandon its long-term drive to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. If in fact Iran halted the other aspects of its nuclear weapons program in 2003, this action almost certainly represents a tactical pause rather than a strategic change of course. In short, Iran now possesses the means as well as the motivation to develop nuclear weapons. Consequently, based on Iran's acquired capabilities and Iran's continued motivations, it is entirely possible that the United States could confront a nuclear-armed or nuclear weapons capable Iran in the next decade.

If such an undesirable scenario were to occur in the next decade despite the international community's best efforts, the U.S. must not be caught unprepared. The U.S. must know what to expect and must know what steps to take to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons capability would dramatically shift the balance of power among Iran and its three most powerful neighbors—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This fact raises many questions, including: How are these three countries responding today to the Iranian nuclear program? How would Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara respond if Tehran were to cross the nuclear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons? Would they pursue nuclear weapons of their own? What factors would influence their decisions? What can the U.S. do now and over the coming years to discourage these countries from pursuing a nuclear weapon of their own? Based on 5 months of research and interviews with hundreds of officials and scholars in the United States and seven Middle Eastern countries, this report attempts to answer these questions. In order to do this, each chapter touches on the respective country's relationship with Iran and the United States, identifies the incentives and disincentives that would influence the state's response to a nuclear-armed Iran, and provides policy considerations that would reduce the chances the state would respond by pursuing nuclear weapons.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL LESSONS ON NUCLEAR “ROLL FORWARD” AND “ROLLBACK”

If Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons capability in the next decade, preventing a nuclear chain reaction in the region would represent one of the most difficult and complex challenges the U.S. has confronted in years. Fortunately, a significant case study history already exists that provides invaluable information on why states make decisions with regard to the development or relinquishment of nuclear weapons programs. According to a comprehensive study by the National Defense University’s (NDU) Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 29 states have pursued nuclear weapons (“roll forward”) since 1945. Of these 29 states, 18 of them willingly abandoned their programs—a decision often called “rollback.”¹ This substantial sample size offers four particularly valuable patterns and lessons that can inform U.S. policy in the Middle East.

First, there rarely exists a single explanation for a nation’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. According to the NDU study, the most influential “roll forward” factors have been: assessment of threat, breakdown of global nonproliferation norms, national pride and unity, personal leadership, strategic deterrent, and perceived weakening of security alliances. The most influential “rollback” factors have been: foreign pressure, impediments to development, international standing, personal leadership, net loss of security, and a reassessment of the threat.² While this list clearly underscores the preeminent role of security calculations in the decision of states regarding the development of nuclear weapons, other factors consistently impact the nuclear decision as well. Scott Sagan, a respected nuclear proliferation scholar, highlights the importance of security considerations in the nuclear “roll forward” decision, but he also emphasizes the influential role of domestic sources. According to Sagan, the parochial interests of actors in the nuclear energy establishment, important interests within the professional military, and domestic interests of politicians can increase the likelihood that a country will pursue nuclear weapons.³ Other scholars agree that one can not dismiss the importance of domestic factors, but place greater emphasis on individual political leaders. For example, it is difficult to ignore the pivotal role of Nasser (Egypt), Gaddafi (Libya), Ben-Gurion (Israel), and the Shah (Iran) in their respective

¹ The countries that have “rolled back” include Norway, Italy, Indonesia, Egypt, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Libya. The Iraqi program was discovered and reversed by force and the Iranian program continues.

² Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,” Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007).

³ Scott D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” *Current History* (April 1997).

country's nuclear decision.⁴ Regardless of the factors one chooses to emphasize, the overall point is clear. Although security considerations usually play a preeminent role in the nuclear proliferation of states, a number of other factors play a decisive role as well.

The South African case study underscores this point. South Africa established its Atomic Energy Corporation in 1948. By the end of the next decade, South Africa was conducting indigenous nuclear research and development. In the mid-1970s, South Africa decided to develop a nuclear weapon capability. According to some reports, South Africa tested a nuclear device in 1979. By 1989, South Africa had built six crude atomic bombs and was at work on a seventh. According to F.W. de Klerk, South Africa decided to build nuclear bombs for a "credible deterrent capability," with the decision being made "against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat in southern Africa," and "South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance, should it be attacked."⁵ In addition to these publicly cited explanations, there were nine major motivations for this South African nuclear program, according to the NDU study. Among these incentives were a perceived threat from communist and African nationalist power, the personal interest of Prime Minister P.W. Botha, a sense of political isolation, and the weakening of civilian oversight of the military.⁶ South Africa only relinquished its nuclear weapons after the coincidence of four developments, each of which appear to be critical to the South African decision. These include:

- *Reassessment of Threat.* The end of the cold war reduced feelings of insecurity as 50,000 Cuban troops withdrew from the region.
- *Desire for International Standing.* After the end of Apartheid, the South African regime sought to normalize relations with the rest of the world in order to achieve the political and economic assistance that would accompany such a move. The normalization of relations required South Africa to relinquish its nuclear weapons.
- *Personal Leadership.* President F.W. de Klerk's personal leadership represented a critical factor in the South African decision.
- *Regime Change.* As the Nationalist Party prepared to relinquish power to the African Nationalist Congress, the Nationalist Party feared the ANC might share nuclear weapons or technologies with its allies in Libya, Cuba, the PLO, or Iran.⁷

Although, some explanations are more important than others, these case studies demonstrate that a single reason cannot explain a country's decision to "roll forward" or "rollback" its nuclear weapons program.

Second, a state's decision regarding the development of nuclear weapons should not be viewed as a single, distinct, irreversible de-

⁴ Gawdat Bahgat, "Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East," *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* (Winter 2005) 408.

⁵ Bill Keller, "South Africa Says It Built 6 Atom Bombs," *New York Times* (March 25, 1993).

⁶ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, "Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation," Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007).

⁷ Ibid. South Africa Case Study.

cision. On the contrary, history consistently demonstrates that the proliferation decisionmaking process of states can be better understood as a series of decision points in which states “dial up” or “dial down” their programs in an effort to keep options open. Decisions related to proliferation evolve slowly and incrementally. Undoubtedly, leaders make specific policy decisions in response to a particular set of initial motivations, but these decisions are frequently reassessed and reversed as the program progresses in response to new developments. While this finding provides hope for those who seek to reverse nuclear weapon programs, it also suggests that the international community can never “rest on its laurels,” trusting that a state has irreversibly turned its back on nuclear weapons. In other words, the U.S. can never declare victory in nonproliferation, either with regard to a particular country or a set of countries. Nonproliferation will have to remain a permanent fixture of U.S. policy. In the future, the increasing diffusion and availability of nuclear technology and know-how will make it easier for states to “dial up” their nuclear weapons programs.

Third, the “drivers” of a state’s nuclear weapons program should not be viewed as constant. In other words, the motivations that catalyze a state’s nuclear program probably differ from the motivations that help to sustain that nuclear program. The “drivers” propelling the program forward continue to evolve over time. Often, as a state’s nuclear program develops, constituencies emerge, momentum builds, and people “rally around” the program. As a result, stopping a program that has already begun presents more of a challenge than preventing the onset of a program in the first place. Once leaders make the decision to pursue nuclear weapons and work begins, discontinuing the pursuit in the face of international pressure would promote an image of weakness that could likely result in political difficulties. Although the initial motivation may have had an overwhelmingly security-centric focus, the political desire to create a domestic and international image of strength may motivate the decision to continue nuclear weapons development.

Fourth, due to its relative power and global influence, U.S. policy often has a strong influence on the decisionmaking of states regarding nuclear weapons. Whether the state represents a potential adversary or a consistent friend, policies of the U.S. often play a decisive role. With potential adversaries, U.S. respect and recognition, the extension of a nonaggression pact, or the credible promise of economic and political benefits can sometimes convince potential adversaries to “rollback” their nuclear weapons programs.

U.S. policies have played an even more decisive role in dissuading allies from pursuing nuclear weapons by extending a reliable U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella over the “vulnerable” ally. Several countries began nuclear weapons programs and decided not to see these programs through to completion due in large degree to a U.S. or U.S.-led security guarantee. These countries include Australia, Italy, Norway, South Korea, and Taiwan.⁸ This is not to suggest that the U.S. security guarantee represented the only factor in the “rollback” decision of these countries, but the extension

⁸Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,” Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007).

of a reliable U.S. security umbrella appears to have influenced each state's "rollback" decision. In the cases of Germany and Japan, both countries can easily obtain nuclear weapons but have chosen not to because of their integration beneath a NATO (Germany) or an American (Japan) security umbrella.

Today, all of these countries have the technical capacity to obtain nuclear weapons in a matter of months or a few short years. Yet, they chose not to because of their respective cost-benefit analyses. Pursuing nuclear weapons demands a large amount of finite money and other resources and could invite punishing international political pressure and economic sanctions. At the same time, little need exists to pursue such an undesirable policy because these countries do not view nuclear weapons as necessary for their national security. This belief derives primarily from the fact that these countries rest comfortably beneath a U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella. If these countries ever begin to question the reliability of this security umbrella, they would almost certainly reassess past nuclear weapons decisions.

One can envision three scenarios that could prompt such a "roll forward" decision by U.S. allies and friends. In the first scenario, a state relying on a U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella can begin to question the reliability of that guarantee due to an escalating perceived threat not matched by a proportional increase in the reliability or capability of the U.S. security guarantee. This relationship between threat perception and the perception of the U.S. security guarantee is more subjective and psychological than objective and quantifiable. Nonetheless, in a growing threat environment, a static U.S. security guarantee can lead to a reassessment of a state's nuclear decision. In the second scenario, states could also begin to question the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee in a static threat environment if the protected state perceives a decline in the capability or will of the U.S. to serve as a security guarantor. In the third and most problematic scenario, a mounting threat perception accompanied by a simultaneous perceived deterioration in the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee, creates the most intense incentive for a state to reassess its nuclear decision. In any of these three scenarios—an increase in the perceived threat, a decrease in the perceived reliability of U.S. security guarantee, or both—the result can be the same; the state looks elsewhere to defend itself. If another security guarantor can be found, the state may seek a new security relationship to replace the U.S. If a partner with both the capability and will to perform as a security guarantor does not exist, the state will seek to improve and expand its internal defense capabilities—likely via nuclear weapons.

These broad historical observations and potential scenarios suggest U.S. policymakers should be concerned about recent developments in the Middle East. In the eyes of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey in particular, Iran's nuclear program has heightened threat perceptions, while the U.S. intervention in Iraq has damaged Arab and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. As a result of this dangerous synergy, these three states in particular appear to be moving deliberately in the direction of a nuclear hedging strategy that would position them to obtain a nuclear weapons breakout capability in

the next two decades. A Middle East populated by a Saudi, Egyptian, and/or Turkish nuclear weapons capability could dramatically reduce regional security and could significantly endanger U.S. interests. The U.S. must take in the next 2 to 3 years to reduce Arab and Turkish threat perceptions and to restore their confidence in the U.S. or U.S.-led security guarantee. Absent deliberate U.S. action in the next few years, the future Middle Eastern landscape may include a number of nuclear armed or nuclear weapons capable states vying for influence in a notoriously unstable region.

CHAPTER 3: SAUDI ARABIA

The development of a Saudi nuclear weapon represents one of the most serious and most likely consequences of an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, it will place tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit. The factor most likely to dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon would be a restored United States-Saudi bilateral relationship and a repaired Saudi perception regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If the United States does not take deliberate action in the coming years to achieve both of these objectives, an Iranian bomb will almost certainly lead to a Saudi bomb.

This chapter will support these arguments in five sections. The first section will describe the possible ramifications of a Saudi nuclear weapon. The second section will explore Saudi perceptions of Iran and the Iranian nuclear program. The third section will describe the nascent Saudi nuclear energy program. The fourth section will set out the arguments as to why an Iranian bomb will likely beget a Saudi nuclear weapon. This section will discuss the centrality of the United States security guarantee in Saudi thinking. The fifth section will suggest those policy actions that might help discourage the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon.

THE WORST CASE SCENARIO

Of any Middle Eastern state, Saudi Arabia is the state most likely to pursue nuclear weapons in response to the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While acknowledging the difficulty inherent in accurately predicting the ramifications of a Saudi nuclear weapon, one can envision a host of likely or possible outcomes that would dramatically undermine peace and stability in the Middle East and severely endanger U.S. interests and security. At some point in the Saudi process of developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, Israel would likely detect the Saudi nuclear activity. Israel might strike a small number of Saudi targets in order to eliminate the program in its infancy. Even if the Saudis could obtain a nuclear weapon without Israeli knowledge, it is difficult to imagine a passive Israeli acceptance of a Saudi nuclear weapon, which the Israelis would likely view as an existential threat. If the Israeli response to a Saudi nuclear weapons program took the form of a military attack it would be seen in the Arab World in the context of an attack from the Jewish state against the Islamic holy land and home of the “two holy mosques.” Such an Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia would represent one of the greatest offenses to Muslims in history and would incite an unprecedented level of radicalization directed against Israel and the United States, possibly resulting in a regionwide conflict between Arab States and Israel.

A Saudi nuclear weapon might also spur a regional nuclear arms race. Iran would likely respond by increasing the number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal, the accuracy of their delivery systems, and the variety of their launch platforms. If Israel took either of these steps—especially in an overt and explicit manner—it would place tremendous political pressure on Egypt to respond.¹ The Egyptian response could consist of a renunciation of its peace treaty with Israel, a repudiation of its relations with the United States, or the initiation of an Egyptian nuclear weapons program. The Egyptian people would undoubtedly demand the government take some forceful and substantial action. This interaction between Israel and Egypt would also be exacerbated by the existence of a Saudi nuclear weapon.

Even if Israel didn't react in this overt way to a Saudi move, a Saudi nuclear weapon would put great pressure on the Egyptians to follow suit. Egypt views itself as the leader of the Arab world and a Saudi nuclear weapon would directly challenge this self conception. Moreover, a Middle East that includes a nuclear-armed Iran and Saudi Arabia would also place significant pressure on the Turks to respond in kind. While this "nuclear cascade" or chain reaction may represent the worst case scenario, it is not outside the realm of possibility if Saudi Arabia responds to Iran by pursuing a nuclear weapon. While it is unlikely that such a nuclear cascade would unfold exactly in this manner, the odds that some of these developments may occur requires that the United States assess the likelihood that Saudi Arabia would pursue a nuclear weapon and take steps to decrease this likelihood.

SAUDI PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN AND THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, the United States would be wise to immediately focus on the Saudi reaction. If Saudi Arabia demonstrates restraint and does not pursue nuclear weapons, it might be possible to forestall a regional nuclear arms cascade, thereby allowing the United States to focus on containing and potentially rolling back Iranian nuclear forces. Conversely, if Saudi Arabia does respond by pursuing nuclear weapons, this could well ignite a regional nuclear arms chain reaction as described above. This would also significantly reduce the likelihood that the international community could convince Iran to relinquish its nuclear weapons. Staff interviews confirm the findings of Rand researchers Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic Wehrey that "Saudi Arabia's reaction is a leading concern among all regional states," and the "Saudi reaction is likely to be the pivot around which inter-Arab debates resolve."² Therefore, the United States must take note of what the Saudis say and what may influence their decision.

¹This report does not take a position on the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons. Although Israel has not officially acknowledged it possesses nuclear weapons, a widespread consensus exists in the region and among experts in the United States that Israel possesses a number of nuclear weapons. For Israel's neighbors, this perception is more important than reality.

²Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, "A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbors," *Survival* (Summer 2007).

What the Saudis Are Saying

When asked about the Iranian nuclear weapons program, senior and mid-level Saudi officials express an apparently unanimous belief among the upper-echelon of the Saudi Government that the Iranian nuclear program does not solely exist for peaceful purposes. One senior Saudi official told staff confidently, "Iran is determined to get a nuclear weapon." While staff found a significant degree of doubt among other GCC states as to whether Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons, Saudi officials conveyed no sense of doubt regarding Iran's intentions. One senior, long-serving U.S. diplomat in Riyadh said he had "never met anyone from the King on down who didn't think it was a nuclear weapons program." According to one senior Saudi official, the Saudis have even told the Iranians that the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) believes Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon.

Saudi officials believe Iran wants a nuclear weapon in order to become a regional superpower, to alleviate a sense of marginalization, to serve as a deterrent, and to be a more dominant force in the Gulf. While senior Saudi officials describe a nuclear-armed Iran as "an existential threat," most Saudi officials do not believe Iran would actually use nuclear weapons against Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia worries that Iranian nuclear weapons would encourage and enable the Iranians to pursue a more aggressive, hegemonic foreign policy in the region. However, it would be inaccurate to completely characterize SAG anxiety regarding Iranian nuclear weapons as purely a "balance of power concern." Based largely on Iran's subversive activities directed against the Saudi regime in the 1980s, some senior Saudi leaders find a nuclear-armed Iran especially disconcerting. Such past Iranian subversion efforts has imbued the senior Saudi leadership with an intense distrust of Tehran. Saudi Arabia currently fears Iranian influence, and finds the notion of a nuclear-armed Iran all the more disconcerting.

When asked about the U.S. response to this apparent Iranian drive for nuclear weapons, Saudi officials encourage the United States to place greater emphasis on diplomatic initiatives, while opposing a quick resort to violence against Iran. Several senior Saudi officials appear to hope that stronger international sanctions, combined with face-saving means for the Iranians to change course, could resolve the nuclear crisis. When presented with a hypothetical choice between a nuclear-armed Iran and a U.S. attack, a significant number of Saudi officials interviewed explicitly or implicitly preferred a U.S. attack. A correlation seems to exist between the seniority of Saudi officials and views on Iranian nuclear weapons. More senior Saudi officials tended to be more "hawkish" in their viewpoint toward Iran. Some key Saudi officials believe a U.S. attack could set the Iranian nuclear program back over a decade. More cautious members of the senior inner circle express concern that a military attack would affect "everything and will not be easy to pull off," and doubt whether a U.S. attack could destroy all key components of the Iranian nuclear program. Based on U.S. actions in Iraq, some key Saudi officials feared a "nightmare" scenario in which the U.S. attacks Iran but fails to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

When asked if Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons in response to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, senior and mid-level Saudi leaders echo the official Saudi line, dismissing the notion as “ridiculous” and saying Saudi Arabia would be the “last country to get nuclear weapons.” Several senior Saudis suggest that Saudi Arabia would rather rely on a U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, when pressed, some senior Saudi officials candidly state that SAG would seek to obtain nuclear weapons or rely on a nuclear guarantee from Pakistan while simultaneously buying parts on the market. It is entirely possible that such statements simply represent an effort by the more hawkish members of the Saudi inner circle to promote a U.S. attack on Iran. However, too many other factors suggest Saudi Arabia would take these steps to dismiss these comments as disingenuous.

While the senior members of the Saudi regime have an especially “hawkish” perspective on Iran, in a meeting with several members of the Majilis ash-Shura (the Saudi Parliament), staff found a perspective quite distinct from the opinions expressed by senior and mid-level officials of the Saudi regime. While these Majilis members have limited influence over the decisions of the Saudi government, their views provide some insight into viewpoints outside the royal family. This group of Majilis members unanimously questioned the reliability of U.S. claims that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons (this meeting took place before the 2007 NIE), dismissed the threat posed by Iran, and opposed a U.S. attack on Iran. One Majilis member appeared to summarize the consensus view saying “Haven’t we had enough wars . . . war is not in the interest of anyone.” Another member predicted that a U.S. attack on Iran would cause the Shia to “stand with Iran” and would cause the Sunni to hate America even more. Members unanimously decried a perceived U.S. double standard when it comes to Israel and Iran, asking why the United States turns a blind eye to alleged Israeli nuclear weapons while opposing the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program. Members unanimously supported Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy and questioned why the United States would talk directly and unconditionally with the North Koreans, but would not do so with Iran.

Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Sunni-Shia Dimension

While much of the Saudi perspective toward Iran and the Iranian nuclear program can be understood from a traditional security and balance of power perspective, a complete understanding of the Saudi viewpoint requires an appreciation of the sectarian dimension as well. Despite public diplomatic niceties exchanged between the two powers, Saudi officials view Iran as a “global ideological threat” and a dangerous potential adversary. The Saudis base their view on 3,000 years of history and the events of the last few decades. However, a large portion of the Saudi perception of Iran is rooted in sectarianism. The Saudis view the Iranian threat at least partly through a Sunni-Shia lens.

If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, the Saudis will, to a large extent, view it as a “Shia bomb.” The Sunni-Shia divide would represent a major incentive for the Saudis to respond to an Iranian nuclear weapon by pursuing one of their own. To understand how

this Muslim religious divide could play a role in the Saudi nuclear decision, it is essential to have at least a cursory understanding of the sectarian differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the Saudi regime's relations with the Saudi Shia and Iran.

The sectarian differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia represent one of the central causes of the tensions between the two countries. Religious ideology plays a large role in informing Saudi foreign policy and would likely represent a key aspect in the Saudi decision on nuclear weapons. The Iranian population is 89 percent Shia and only 9 percent Sunni.³ A Shia religious hierarchy headed by Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei controls the reins of power in Iran and views itself as the spiritual vanguard and shepherd of Shia worldwide. In contrast, Saudi Arabia is overwhelmingly Sunni, with a Saudi Shia population of only 10–15 percent.⁴ The Saudi royal family is Sunni and has maintained a long alliance with the leadership of a particularly strident wing of Sunni Islam founded by Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab.

This form of Wahhabi Islam has dominated Saudi Arabia since the nation's founding. It views the Shia as rafida (those who reject the faith). This religious classification of the Saudi Shia later served as justification for Ibn Saud's decision to enforce the payment of jizya (an Islamic tax imposed on non-Muslims) against the Shia residing in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.⁵ As a result of this widespread view of the Shia as pseudo-Muslims or non-Muslims, the Shia in Saudi Arabia have suffered from a severe lack of religious freedom and civil rights. To complicate matters for the Saudi regime, the concentration of Shia in Saudi Arabia happens to be colocated with Saudi Arabia's major oil fields. As the Saudi oil industry matured, an increasing number of Saudi Shia transitioned from working on farms to working in menial jobs in the burgeoning oil industry in Saudi Arabia's eastern provinces. In 1950, it is estimated that 60 percent of ARAMCO employees were Shia. According to a senior U.S. diplomat in Saudi Arabia, that number now stands at roughly 70 percent. While King Abdullah has taken steps to improve the plight of Shia in Saudi Arabia, staff meetings with various members of the Saudi Shia community clearly demonstrate that a widespread perception of inequality persists among Saudi Shia. This Shia predominance in ARAMCO and in the vicinity of the oil wells that represent the well-spring of Saudi wealth and power represents a major source of concern and potential vulnerability for the Saudi regime.

The domestic tensions between the Saudi regime and the Saudi Shia impact Saudi-Iranian relations and would influence the Saudi decision on nuclear weapons due to a number of specific events in the last few decades. The 1979 Iranian Revolution had a profound impact on Saudi Arabia's sense of insecurity and its perception of the Saudi Shia. As already detailed, the House of Saud's insecurities did not just appear in 1979, and tensions between the Sunni ruling family and the Saudi Shia date to the birth of the Saudi

³"Iran," CIA Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html> #People.

⁴"Freedom in the World 2007: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties" (Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, 2007) 687.

⁵Madawi al-Rasheed, "A History of Saudi Arabia" (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002) 41, 89.

state. However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution dramatically exacerbated both of these problems. The new Iranian regime questioned the Islamic credentials of the Saudi regime, criticized the Saudi regime's relations with the United States, and emboldened the Shia residing in Saudi Arabia. In 1979, encouraged by the Iranian Revolution, the Saudi Shia took to the streets in Saudi Arabia's eastern provinces to commemorate Ashura—a Shia rite outlawed by the Saudi regime that mourns the death of Hasan and Husayn. The Saudi regime responded by dispatching 20,000 National Guard soldiers. The following year, the Saudi Shia held large demonstrations and a series of strikes in Qatif to commemorate the first anniversary of Khomeini's return to Iran.⁶ The Saudi National Guard responded aggressively, killing some demonstrators and dispersing the rest. Following these uprisings, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution developed. This clandestine Shia organization representing the Saudi Shia in the eastern province was comprised primarily of students from the University of Minerals and Petroleum in Dammam and workers in the oil fields. This organization broadcasted from Iranian radio stations in an attempt to reach the Saudi Shia and opened an information office in Tehran to promote political activism among the Saudi Shia.⁷ The anti-Saudi rhetoric of the Iranian Government promoted agitation among Saudi Shia and escalated tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

When war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980, Saudi Arabia sided with Sunni-led Iraq against the Shia-dominated Iran. Saudi Arabia felt threatened by both states. Both Iran and Iraq had larger populations and more powerful militaries than Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein's efforts to promote pan-Arabism and Iran's attempt to export its form of Islamic revolution threatened the Saudi regime. However, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated \$25.7 billion in aid to Iraq because Saudi Arabia saw Iran's export of Shia Islamic revolution as the greater of the two threats.

As the Iran-Iraq war continued throughout the 1980s, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca for the Hajj became another source of religiously grounded tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Each year, thousands of Iranians made the trip to Mecca to participate in this important Muslim tradition. While in Saudi Arabia, many Iranian pilgrims would organize demonstrations and denounce the Saudi regime for its relations with the United States. Clashes between the Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces became a regular fixture of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca during the decade. In 1987, major clashes occurred between the Saudi security forces and protesting pilgrims in which 400 people were killed, including 275 Iranians.⁸ After this incident, tensions mounted dramatically between the Iranian regime and the Saudi Government, with the Iranian leadership calling for the ouster of the Saudi royal family. The Saudi regime responded to the hostile Iranian rhetoric and suspected incidents of Iranian sabotage and subversion by introducing a quota system partly intended to reduce the number of Iranian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj. While Saudi Arabia

⁶Ibid, 143–147.

⁷Ibid, 147.

⁸Michael Ross, "Gulf Supply Ship Hits Mine; Sinks Another; Blast Rocks Saudi Plant on Coast; Iranian Sabotage Hinted," *The Los Angeles Times* (Aug. 16, 1987).

and Iran enjoyed a period of detente in the 1990s, the Sunni-Shia animosities and insecurity still continue to resonate deeply in the thinking of the Saudi regime. This Saudi history with Iran and the Saudi Shia has imbued the Saudi ruling family with a deep skepticism regarding the intentions of the Iranians and the loyalty of some Saudi Shia. This troubled past with Iran and the Saudi Shia figures prominently in Saudi thinking and would significantly shape the Saudi response to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon.

THE SAUDI NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM

In December 2006, Saudi Arabia joined the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to announce their intention to explore the development of a shared nuclear power program. These six countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) join Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Turkey as countries who have expressed interest in developing nuclear energy programs in the wake of Iran's nuclear activities. The GCC states have taken great pains to cooperate with the IAEA fully and to progress in a transparent manner. At the initial announcement, the Saudi Foreign Minister said, "This is not a secret and we are doing this out in the open. Our aim is to obtain the technology for peaceful purposes, no more no less."⁹

Despite these assurances, numerous individuals interviewed by staff expressed a belief that the GCC announcement should be seen primarily as a response to Iran's nuclear program. Analysts and scholars in the United States and the Arab world interviewed by staff believe the Saudi-led announcement was intended to communicate to the Iranians, "we can play this game too," while building a foundation of nuclear knowledge and expertise that would be useful should Saudi Arabia decide to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.

This is not to suggest the Saudis do not have an energy-based argument for their interest in nuclear energy. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Saudi Arabia's Water and Electricity Ministry (WEM) predicts that the country's electricity demand will double by the years 2023–25. Saudi Arabia already uses large amounts of its oil for domestic energy needs. In fact, 7 years ago, 16 of every 100 barrels of Saudi oil were consumed in Saudi Arabia. This year the amount of Saudi oil consumed in-country has grown to 22 of every 100 barrels, even as the global oil market has become tighter. As the Saudis seek to build an industrial infrastructure and employ more Saudis, consumption demands will continue to grow.¹⁰ Given the high price of oil and gas, the Saudis would rather export their fossil fuels than burn them. A nuclear power capacity would allow the Saudis to export more oil and gas and consume less. However, the timing and the forum for the Saudi-led announcement suggests the primary purpose of the decision was to warn the Iranians and begin the process of a nuclear-

⁹Abdullah Shihri and Diana Elias, "Arab States Study Shared Nuclear Program," Associated Press (Dec. 11, 2006).

¹⁰Neil King, "Saudi Industrial Drive Strains Oil-Export Role," Wall Street Journal (Dec. 12, 2007).

hedging strategy that will keep Saudi Arabia's nuclear options open.

This does not mean that Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states will have a nuclear power generation capability in the next 5 years. Since the December 2006 announcement, several rounds of GCC meetings have been held, but little tangible progress appears to have been made. In the case of the GCC states, tangible progress toward a nuclear energy program lags far behind the political rhetoric and ambition. In other words, a shared GCC nuclear power generation capacity remains at least a decade in the future if not longer. Most of the government individuals interviewed by staff in the GCC seem to be unaware of the magnitude of the task involved in developing a nuclear power program.

Nonetheless, the GCC rhetoric, and especially the Saudi rhetoric, should be considered as more than mere political positioning. A genuine desire to develop a nuclear power program exists in the Middle East. This desire appears to be partially motivated by energy considerations and mostly motivated by a desire to match the Iranian nuclear program and to keep options open regarding nuclear weapons. If current trends continue, U.S. decisionmakers should expect to see a GCC nuclear power generation capacity within the next two decades.

While this development may be unwelcome to many U.S. observers, the U.S. Government has supported the GCC expressions of interest in nuclear energy. As the GCC program progresses, the United States should monitor closely the degree to which the GCC states cooperate with the IAEA and whether these states express an interest in enrichment or reprocessing.

WILL THE SAUDIS SEEK A NUCLEAR WEAPON?

One of the central questions staff attempted to answer throughout this study was whether Saudi Arabia would respond to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon by pursuing a weapon as well. In addition to the responses detailed above from Saudi Government officials, staff interviewed a large number of U.S. officials and Saudi scholars in Saudi Arabia, as well as a significant number of U.S. scholars in Washington. While responses varied, virtually every person interviewed by staff believed that Saudi Arabia would be the country most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb. Significant disagreement existed regarding the Saudi's final decision, as well as their capability to obtain a nuclear weapon, but almost all individuals agreed that the United States should monitor Saudi Arabia, specifically. One senior U.S. diplomat said a Saudi nuclear weapon would be the "real downside" of an Iranian nuclear weapon, predicting that a Saudi pursuit of a nuclear weapon would be "virtually certain." Referring to the Saudis, another senior U.S. diplomat with excellent access to the highest levels of the Saudi Government said that the idea of an Iranian nuclear weapon "frightens them to their core" and would lead the Saudis to pursue a nuclear weapon of their own. Some acknowledged these Saudi fears, but argued that the importance of the bilateral relationship with the United States would dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon.

Most individuals interviewed argue that any future Saudi decision regarding nuclear weapons would be primarily based upon the Saudi assessment of the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If the Saudis believe the United States lacks the will or capability to defend Saudi Arabia against a nuclear-armed Iran, Saudi Arabia is more likely to pursue a nuclear weapons capability of its own. To appreciate the importance of U.S. security guarantees in Saudi strategic thinking, it is necessary to briefly review the history of United States-Saudi relations.

Since the creation of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the Saudi regime has harbored a deep sense of vulnerability to foreign invasion or attack due to a number of factors. The vast, sparsely populated country of Saudi Arabia has vulnerable borders and coastlines along with the world's largest reserve of oil. These factors, combined with the traditional weakness of the Saudi military and the frequently tense relations with its neighbors, compelled the Saudis to seek and maintain a security relationship with a trustworthy foreign power. In February 1945, the Kingdom's founder, Ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud, reached out to Franklin Roosevelt and the United States to forge a strategic relationship. The strategic relationship that evolved over the next 55 years essentially revolved around a simple agreement: Saudi Arabia would provide the United States and the international community with a reliable source of oil, and in return, the United States would support the Saudi regime and guarantee Saudi Arabia's security. To be sure, between 1945 and 2001, the threats to the Saudi ruling family changed, and the strength of the United States-Saudi bilateral relationship waxed and waned, but this grand strategic pact remained essentially in tact.

The events of September 11, 2001, directly challenged the United States-Saudi strategic relationship. The fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers had Saudi backgrounds significantly increased anti-Saudi popular animosity in the United States. The Saudi regime was simultaneously embarrassed that its citizens had committed such an act and dismayed by what it perceived to be the unjustified and vitriolic response of many Americans toward Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime believed Americans should have differentiated between "a few bad apples" and the majority of the Saudi people and the Saudi regime. While one can question the degree of Saudi commitment against al-Qaeda prior to the 2003 al-Qaeda bombings in Riyadh, those bombings marked a significant turning point for the Saudi regime. These 2003 bombings eliminated any lingering doubt in the Saudi regime as to whether al-Qaeda represented a threat to the Saudi ruling family. As a result, since 2003, the Saudis have taken comprehensive steps to defeat al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and to cooperate with U.S.-led international efforts to curtail al-Qaeda's international financing and identify members of al-Qaeda. As one senior U.S. diplomat in Saudi Arabia explained, in the wake of the 2003 al-Qaeda bombings in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi security forces engaged in running street battles with al-Qaeda and have subsequently made great strides in confronting al-Qaeda in the Kingdom.

Iraq and Saudi Perceptions of the U.S. Security Guarantee

While the U.S. security guarantee will play a central role in Saudi Arabia's nuclear decisionmaking, according to numerous individuals interviewed, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the manner in which United States has conducted the Iraq war since 2003 eroded Saudi perceptions of U.S. political wisdom and military capability. The Saudis believe the U.S. performance in Iraq, and the manner in which U.S. decisions were made, have dramatically increased Iranian influence in Iraq, unnerving the Saudis and reducing the reservoir of trust the United States built up in Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990–91. While the Saudis strongly supported the 2007 U.S. “surge” in Iraq and welcomed the U.S. strategy to work with Sunni tribal leaders to establish order and oppose al-Qaeda, these steps have not fully remedied the significant loss of U.S. credibility. Saudi frustration with U.S. actions in Iraq and a perceived failure of the Bush administration to listen to Saudi counsel have reached such a threshold that King Abdullah often refuses to discuss Iraq with visiting senior U.S. officials. The Saudis want the United States to commit whatever number of soldiers and resources necessary to achieve success in Iraq. The Saudis define success in Iraq as a durable end-state that consists of a peaceful, stable, and unified Iraq ruled by an Iraqi regime that fully incorporates Iraq's Sunnis, adamantly opposes Iranian meddling in Iraq, and assiduously seeks peaceful relations with its neighbors. As U.S. decisionmakers debate U.S. policy in Iraq, they should fully appreciate the second-order effects that the outcome in Iraq will have on United States-Saudi relations and U.S. efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Anticipating the Counter Arguments

Those who believe Saudi Arabia would not respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons by pursuing a weapon of its own usually emphasize one of three arguments. The first argument suggests the value the Saudis place on their relationship with the United States would dissuade them from taking a nuclear decision that would severely damage their most important bilateral relationship. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States. The United States has served as Saudi Arabia's most important security guarantor since 1945. However, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States because the United States has served Saudi Arabia's interests. If Saudi Arabia comes to believe the United States can not or will not protect the Kingdom and its core interests, the Saudi regime will not hesitate to develop the independent means to deter its enemies. The fact that no state can fully replace the United States as Saudi Arabia's security guarantor for the next two decades will shape Saudi decisionmaking. If the United States does not take assertive steps now to restore Saudi faith in the U.S. security guarantee, this fact will increase the likelihood that the Saudis will respond to a perceived decline in the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the emergence of an Iranian nuclear threat by pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent.

The second argument frequently cited as to why the Saudis would not pursue nuclear weapons relates to the character of the

regime. Some argue the Saudi regime is too conservative, too timid to take such a bold and controversial step. However, the Saudi regime's undoubtedly conservative and occasionally timid approach to foreign relations has not kept Saudi Arabia from taking covert and controversial measures in the past in order to protect its interests. The Saudi acquisition of 50–60 CSS-2 missiles, 10–15 mobile launchers, and technical support from China at a cost of about \$3 to \$3.5 billion in the late 1980s provides a preeminent example.¹¹ These missiles, which represent some of the longest-range missiles in the world, were acquired by the Saudis after the U.S. decision not to sell the Saudis surface to surface missiles.¹² This Saudi move apparently reflected anything but a conservative or timid approach. Apparently conducted without the knowledge of Israel or the United States, General Khaled bin Sultan, who served as commander of Arab forces during Desert Shield and Desert Storm and who oversaw the Saudi acquisition of the Chinese missiles, visited China four times to close the deal. Detailing his responsibilities, he said:

My task was to negotiate the deal, devise an appropriate deception plan, choose a team of Saudi officers and men and arrange for their training in both Saudi Arabia and China, build and defend operation bases and storage facilities in different parts of the Kingdom, arrange for the shipment of the missiles from China and, at every stage, be ready to defend the project against sabotage or any other form of attack.¹³

The Saudis have denied U.S. requests for an onsite inspection of the missiles. Responding to such a request, Saudi Defense Minister Prince and now Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdel Aziz al-Saud said, "Many people think that we're dependent on the United States for arms, and even say we're subservient to American policy. The acquisition of Chinese missiles proves the opposite."¹⁴ In short, the Saudi acquisition of the Chinese CSS-2 missiles in the late 1980s strongly suggests that the Saudis are willing to bypass or risk alienating the United States in order to protect Saudi interests.

The third argument often cited to suggest that Saudi Arabia would not pursue nuclear weapons relates to Saudi Arabia's nuclear technology capabilities. There exists a relatively strong consensus regarding the immature state of Saudi Arabia's nuclear technology infrastructure. Saudi Arabia lacks the human expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapons program on its own. Experts consistently describe Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure and know how as far inferior to Egypt and Turkey.

Notwithstanding these apparent facts, observers should not underestimate Saudi Arabia's ability to obtain the technology re-

¹¹ Richard L. Russell, *Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East* (Routledge: New York, 2005) 114.

¹² James A. Russell, "Saudi Arabia in the Twenty-First Century: A New Security Calculus?" *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, Edited by James A. Russell (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006) 121.

¹³ Richard L. Russell, *Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East* (Routledge: New York, 2005) 113.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 114.

quired. Many scholars and U.S. diplomats believe Saudi Arabia may have some sort of formal or informal understanding with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have common interests and complementary assets. Pakistan has a nuclear capability and limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no nuclear capability and virtually unlimited money. While no solid evidence exists to confirm the formalization of such an agreement, some circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement or “understanding” may exist. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both primarily Sunni countries, both have a history of tense relations with Iran. Also, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan enjoy a long history of military cooperation. In fact, Pakistani deployed troops to Saudi soil from 1979 to 1987, and the two countries cooperated extensively in the 1980s to fight the Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan. Furthermore, then-Crown Prince Abdullah visited Pakistan a few months after Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests, raising some eyebrows.¹⁵

None of this proves the existence of a nuclear understanding between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but if such an agreement exists, the transfer could manifest itself in four different forms. First, in the eventuality of an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Pakistanis could transfer nuclear technology or materials to the Saudis. This transfer could jump-start the Saudi nuclear program and would dramatically reduce the time between a Saudi political decision to move forward on nuclear weapons and the Saudi development of a nuclear weapons capability. This transfer could take place at the official government to government level or at the sub-national level, reminiscent of the A.Q. Kahn network. Pakistan could also deploy Pakistani nuclear forces to Saudi Arabia. This scenario may not incur the same international condemnation of the other two options and arguably would not violate the NPT.

A third option might take the form of a Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia utilizing missiles in Pakistan. The Pakistani transfer of a finished nuclear weapon to Saudi Arabia represents the fourth, and probably the least viable, option. As a general rule, the contemporary popular discussion of these options underestimates the difficulty of transferring nuclear weapons and the construction of a nuclear weapon. While adoption of this last option may be unlikely, a transfer of nuclear technology, a stationing of Pakistani nuclear forces in Saudi Arabia, or a Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia would be quite plausible.

Therefore, based on this analysis, an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would place extraordinary pressure on the Saudis to follow suit. If the United States does not take deliberate steps in the next few years to improve United States-Saudi relations and restore Saudi trust in the U.S. security guarantee, Saudi Arabia could respond to an Iranian bomb by obtaining one of its own or seeking some sort of security understanding with Pakistan. The following steps would help reduce the likelihood of such a response.

¹⁵Thomas W. Lippman, “Saudi Arabia: The Calculations of Uncertainty,” *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices*. Edited by Kurt M. Campbell, et al. (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2004).

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

- *Reiterate U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Weapons.* The United States needs to clarify and communicate its policies and attitudes toward nuclear weapons proliferation. Traditional U.S. policy toward nuclear proliferation essentially stated that no nuclear proliferation was acceptable or desirable. However, in recent years, some U.S. Government statements and policies have promoted an international perception that America tolerates nuclear proliferation among its friends, but not among its enemies. In Saudi Arabia, a few scholars and government officials half-jokingly predicted to staff that the United States would end up encouraging Saudi Arabia to obtain nuclear weapons in response to an Iranian bomb. Therefore, the United States should deliberately and explicitly clarify its attitudes regarding a potential Saudi nuclear weapons program. The U.S. should not wait for Iran to cross the nuclear threshold before taking this step. The United States should privately reiterate in an unambiguous manner that its interests would not be served by a Saudi nuclear weapons program.
- *Understanding the Relationship Between a Peaceful and Stable Iraq and the Credibility of any U.S. Security Guarantee to the Saudis.* The step most likely to dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb would be a strong and tangible reiteration of the U.S. security guarantee. The degree to which the Saudis would be willing to trust these U.S. security assurances will be affected by the outcome in Iraq. As detailed above, U.S. missteps in Iraq have seriously shaken Saudi confidence in the wisdom of U.S. decisionmakers and the capabilities of the U.S. military. As U.S. decisionmakers debate U.S. policy in Iraq, they should fully appreciate the second-order effects that the outcome in Iraq will have on United States-Saudi relations and U.S. efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
- *Fix the Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Problem.* Between fiscal year 2000 and 2004, the number of U.S. nonimmigrant visas issued in Saudi Arabia declined 80 percent, from 78,599 to 16,070. For fiscal year 2007, the number was 32,909, only 41 percent of the pre-9/11 amount. (See Appendix 2)¹⁶ From a security and homeland defense perspective, one can appreciate the need for a significant reduction in the number of NIVs issued to Saudis immediately after 9/11. The events of that day demanded a thorough review of U.S. policy and procedures to ensure the United States could filter out the small number of Saudis with bad intentions from the large pool of Saudis who wish to come to the United States to study, vacation, and do business. However, more than 5 years later, the number of U.S.-issued NIVs remains at less than 50 percent of pre-9/11 levels.

A surprising number of current Saudi leaders have attended university in the United States. This past accessibility for

¹⁶ Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State. These numbers include all visas issued in Saudi Arabia, some of which are non-Saudi citizens. However, Saudis represented the large majority of these visas. The 2007 number is only through December 15th.

Saudis to the United States has led to a government, business, and military elite in Saudi Arabia which generally speak English and view America positively. This common language and common experience with U.S. officials represents an intangible—yet vitally important—factor that promotes strong ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia and helps secure U.S. interests. In meeting after meeting in Riyadh, staff encountered senior Saudi officials, businesspeople, and military officers who, based on their undergraduate, graduate, or military studies in the United States, spoke fluent English and thought well of America and Americans. In one meeting, staff met with a senior member of the Saudi military who had spent years attending U.S. military schools, including the U.S. Army War College. As a result of this experience, the officer spoke fluent English, held progressive viewpoints, and joked that he considered himself as much American as Saudi. It is difficult to overestimate the value of having such an individual at the senior decisionmaking level within the Saudi military.

Since 9/11, the inability of many Saudis to obtain NIVs has resulted in a major shift in this valuable dynamic. Making matters worse, seemingly every Saudi either has or claims to know someone who has a “horror story” about his own post 9/11 treatment at U.S. airports. This has resulted in an increasing number of Saudi students, businesspeople, and military officers who either cannot come or do not want to come to the United States to study or conduct business. (See Appendix 3) Instead, this next generation of Saudi leaders will either stay in Saudi Arabia or go elsewhere. At one meeting, staff met a highly successful Saudi businessman who said that he and many of his fellow Saudi businessmen were no longer willing to travel to the United States. As a result, these Saudi businesspeople will only sign contracts with non-U.S. companies, or when a U.S.-based company is involved, the Saudis insist that the contract contain a clause that states that all meetings must be held outside of the United States.

Other countries are taking advantage of the U.S. failure to fix its visa-related problems. According to U.S. Embassy personnel in Riyadh, the British issue 98 percent of their NIVs in 48 hours and even go to the homes of Saudis to facilitate the process. In contrast, U.S. Embassy officials in Riyadh report that the CEO of Saudi ARAMCO waited months for a visa to visit the United States. The British officials, unlike some of their American counterparts, understand the long-term ramifications of NIVs on their bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia. In short, unless the United States fixes its NIV—issuance process, the next generation of Saudis will increasingly look elsewhere to attend school and do business. This somewhat intangible short-term impediment will have increasingly tangible long-term consequences for U.S. strategic relations with a country that sits on top of the world’s largest reserve of oil. While never losing sight of the central responsibility to protect Americans, the United States needs to increase the number of NIVs issued to Saudis and reduce the waiting period.

- *Cooperate With the Saudis on Nuclear Energy.* From a security and counterterrorism perspective, a Middle East devoid of nuclear power plants is preferable to a Middle East dotted with them. However, if the governments of the region are determined to pursue nuclear power—and staff believes they are—the United States can do little to stop them. If the U.S. and U.S. companies do not work with the states of the Middle East in developing their nuclear energy programs, other countries will step in to take America's place. If countries such as Saudi Arabia are determined to pursue nuclear energy, the U.S. and U.S. companies should immediately offer to help them. By having American nuclear energy companies—instead of Russian, French, or Chinese companies—working with Saudi Arabia, the United States secures several advantages. First, the U.S. Government can work with U.S. companies to ensure the Saudi nuclear power plants incorporate the best quality safeguards possible. Second, the involvement of U.S. companies provides the U.S. Government a degree of indirect oversight that helps ensure a peaceful nuclear program remains that way. Finally, the involvement of U.S. companies represents another way to solidify the bilateral relationship with the country that controls the world's largest reserve of oil.
- *Mind the Succession.* King Abdullah, the current ruler of Saudi Arabia, was born in 1920. The next family member in line to take the throne, Crown Prince Sultan, was born in 1928. While Saudi Arabia appears to have taken some steps to ease the impending succession, the country will likely endure significant turmoil in the next decade or so when both of these individuals pass away. These individuals, and a small group loyal to them, retain a veto over any nuclear decision. In a decade, it is not difficult to imagine a different ruler in Saudi Arabia with different thinking regarding nuclear weapons. With that said, most of the dynamics detailed in this chapter would influence future Saudi rulers as well as current ones.
- *Address Saudi "Releasability" Concerns.* During the staffs research in Saudi Arabia, one of the most consistent concerns related to the "releasability" of U.S. weapons. This term refers to the process in which a U.S. company and a U.S. administration attempt to sell U.S. weapons to the Saudis. Congress has an oversight role in these sales and has the right to delay or block any sales it perceives as counter to U.S. interests. Often these concerns have revolved around a desire to maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage. In other words, American policy has consistently attempted to ensure that Israel—America's close friend in the region—maintained a qualitative military advantage over its Arab neighbors given the history of Arab-Israeli war and conflict.

Regardless of the specific Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia or the current inventory of Saudi weapons, U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia serve three primary purposes: First, the arms sales to Saudi Arabia represent a tangible symbol to the Saudis of the U.S. security guarantee. When the United States responds positively to Saudi weapons requests, it provides visible confirmation of the U.S. security guarantee. On the other

hand, if the United States is not willing to sell Saudi Arabia many weapons systems, this negatively impacts the Saudi perception of United States reliability.

Second, selling U.S. weapons systems to Saudi Arabia represents much more than a single business transaction. When the United States sells a fighter, tank, or other high-dollar weapons system to a foreign country the benefit is much greater than a financial windfall for a U.S. company. A logistical, maintenance, and training package that usually extends for the life of the system almost always accompanies the weapon system. In other words, when the United States sells a weapons system to a foreign country, it secures a 20-year relationship that helps cement the bilateral relationship.

Third, selling U.S. weapons to America's allies and friends enables the future interoperability of U.S. military forces and the forces of the nation that purchases American hardware. Either now or in the future, if the United States seeks to create a seamless defense network with friendly and allied nations, common weapons systems greatly facilitate this objective.

Legitimate concerns exist regarding the qualitative military advantage of Israel and some of the weapons included in proposed arms packages. However, Congress should understand that stalling or rejecting the sale of selected U.S. military systems to Saudi Arabia will strengthen perceptions in the Arab world that the United States is an unreliable security partner. This is especially true in the case of missile defense systems. This is not to suggest the United States should unquestioningly give the Saudis anything they request. The United States should approach such arms sales in a cautious and judicious manner. However, delay or rejection of Saudi arms purchases will complicate the long-term bilateral relationship and will lead Saudi Arabia to turn to Russia, China, France, or Britain for weapons.

CHAPTER 4: EGYPT

Egypt represents another one of the three countries most likely to respond to the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon by developing one of its own. Undoubtedly, an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would ignite a debate in Cairo as to whether Egypt should pursue nuclear weapons as well. However, based on research, as well as interviews and meetings in Egypt, staff believes that although such a development in Iran would hasten Egypt's nuclear energy efforts, Egypt would most likely choose not to cross the nuclear threshold and obtain a nuclear weapon. With that said, two variables relating to Israel and Saudi Arabia could shift Cairo's thinking, potentially tilting the scales in the direction of the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

This chapter will consist of five sections. First, this chapter will discuss Egypt's past and present nuclear power program. The second section will explore Egyptian-Iranian relations. The third section will directly analyze whether Egypt would pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb. Fourth, the chapter will explore the Israeli and Saudi variables that could influence the decision in Cairo. Finally, this chapter will end with some policy considerations for protecting U.S. interests and dissuading Egypt from pursuing nuclear weapons.

EGYPT'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM: PAST AND PRESENT

Egypt started its nuclear energy program in 1955, with President Gamal Nasser's creation of Egypt's Atomic Energy Authority (EAEA). The Egyptians began to operate a 2 megawatt, Soviet supplied research reactor in 1961. Over the next 5 years, Egypt negotiated its first nuclear power plant with GE and Westinghouse before the 1967 war brought these efforts to an end. President Anwar Sadat revived Egypt's nuclear power program in the 1970s, working with Westinghouse once again. In 1981, after the Camp David Agreement, Egypt signed the NPT. This second major effort came to an end in 1986 due to safety concerns in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union.¹ In 1997, an Argentine company completed construction of a 22-megawatt research reactor north of Cairo. Both the Soviet and Argentine reactors, as well as a nuclear fuel manufacturing pilot plant, are under IAEA safeguards. Between 1997 and 2002, Egypt participated in a series of Technical Cooperation projects with the IAEA, conducting work directly relevant to nuclear power generation. Some of the work included: uranium exploration, a feasibility study for small and medium nuclear power plants, and training of Egyptian personnel. Since 2002, Egypt has conducted similar projects with the IAEA re-

¹Dan Murphy, "Middle East Racing to Nuclear Power," Christian Science Monitor (Nov. 1, 2007).

lated to uranium exploration and the training of Egyptian personnel. Today, Cairo refuses to sign the Additional Protocol, until Israel signs and complies with the NPT.

Unlike some of the other states in the Middle East that have announced plans to build nuclear power plants, Egypt has a pressing need to develop alternative domestic sources of energy. Egypt has a limited supply of domestic energy sources, and the country's energy demand continues to grow as quickly. According to the Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency, Egypt's production of oil has declined from its 1996 peak of 922,000 (bbl/d) to 579,000 in 2005. According to the Egyptian government, the current total installed capacity of electricity generation in Egypt is roughly 21.3 GW, and last year's peak load was approximately 18.2 GW. If this situation remained constant, Egypt would be in relatively good shape. However, Egypt's electricity demand increased at an average annual growth rate of 7 percent over the last decade, while increasing 10.3 percent last year. With economic growth of 4.8 percent and a population growth of 1.75 percent, Egypt's energy demand is likely to increase rapidly in the coming years.² Recent discoveries of natural gas will satisfy some of this growing demand, but Egypt will need other sources of energy as well.

Recognizing its limited amount of fossil fuels and its growing demand for energy, Egypt continues to aggressively pursue hydro, wind, and solar energy. According to the Egyptian Government, Egypt has almost fully utilized its hydroelectric sources of energy. In addition, Egypt has a wind energy installed capacity at the Red Sea coast of 230 MW (about 1 percent of total installed capacity), and this wind energy contribution to the nation's energy production capacity is expected to grow to 3 percent by 2010. Egypt is also evaluating an integrated solar-thermal power plant that would contribute 150 MW. While these efforts are impressive, the Egyptian Government believes they will not be able to meet Egypt's future energy needs.³

This growing need for energy is not the only motivation behind Egypt's interest in a nuclear power program. The presence of an Iranian nuclear program also motivates Egypt to establish its own program. As Antoine Basbous, Director of the Arab World Observatory, says, Mubarak's actions tell Iran that Egypt "will not allow Tehran to be the sole regional power to control the atom." Most individuals interviewed by staff over the last few months shared this response. Egypt sees itself as the leader of the Arab world; therefore, a decision to pursue nuclear energy serves political purposes internationally as well as domestically.

Based on this desire to increase its domestic energy production capacity, Egypt appears to be moving decisively to construct nuclear power plants. In 2006, Mubarak initiated a national dialogue to discuss electrical energy resources, including nuclear power. In October 2007, President Mubarak announced his decision to initiate a program to build nuclear power stations in Egypt. Throughout this process, Egypt has worked closely and transparently with

²Mostafa El-Asiry, "The Introduction of Nuclear Power in Egypt: An Overview." PowerPoint presentation by Egyptian Government official at IAEA Technical Meeting in Vienna, Austria, 5-9 November 2007.

³Ibid.

the IAEA, emphasizing that it only seeks a “peaceful nuclear program.” While Egypt appears to be serious about developing nuclear power plants, much work remains to be done. Some of the more onerous tasks that lie ahead for Cairo include developing the legal and legislative framework, selecting sites, improving the infrastructure, and developing the necessary human resources. While Egypt has periodically toyed with the idea of nuclear energy in the past without success, the future energy needs of Egypt and the current Iranian nuclear program suggest that this time might be different.

EGYPT AND IRAN

To gain a better understanding of how Egypt views the Iranian nuclear program and how Egypt might respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to briefly review the state of Egyptian-Iranian relations. In many respects, the respective self conceptions, demographics, and political relations pit the two countries against one another. Egypt sees itself as the leader of the Arab world and is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. Iran, on the other hand, views itself as a “Persian power” and has a population that is overwhelmingly Shia Muslim. Iran acts as a leading anti-American and anti-Israeli voice in the Muslim world. In contrast, Egypt enjoys a close security and political relationship with the United States and represents the first Arab State to make formal peace with Israel. These underlying dynamics have resulted in specific events in the last three decades that have exacerbated relations between Iran and Egypt.

Egypt’s relationship with Iran has been especially strained since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. One of the first crises in the relationship occurred when Egypt granted the Shah of Iran exile after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. This decision, combined with Egypt’s decision to sign the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel, led Iran to break relations with Egypt in 1979. When the Shah died in 1980, he was buried in Al-Rifa’i Mosque in Cairo. In October 1981, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated during a military parade in Cairo, apparently in response to Sadat’s role in making peace with Israel. The Iranian leadership responded by naming a street in Tehran after Khaled Eslamboli, Sadat’s assassin. During the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war, Egypt supported Iraq.

Today, the Egyptian leadership views Iran as a threat with or without nuclear weapons, but Egypt would perceive a nuclear armed Iran as especially threatening. However, Egypt sees Iran as a political and strategic threat and not an existential or military one. Staff found no Egyptian official or scholar who feared a nuclear or conventional attack from Iran. Rather, Egyptian decision-makers and scholars see Iran as a threat to Egypt’s prestige, national identity, and political stability. Iran’s efforts to expand its power and assert its regional leadership role directly threatens Egypt’s national identity as the leading Arab power. Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas endangers Egypt’s political stability. Furthermore, from the Mubarak government’s perspective, Iran’s hard-line against Israel and the United States provides an unwelcome contrast with Egypt’s relations with these two unpopular powers. Interestingly, it was widely reported that the two most popular individuals on the Sunni streets of Cairo during the 2006 war be-

tween Israel and Hezbollah were Hassan Nasrallah (The head of Hezbollah) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (President of Iran), both outspoken Shia leaders. The Egyptian regime fears Sunni Islamic radicalism in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and also fears Iranian political power and ideological appeal.

Based on staff interviews and research, many Egyptians view the Iranian nuclear program largely through the lens of Israel and Israel's purported nuclear weapons.⁴ Egypt has long called for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. While Cairo has lived with an assumed Israeli nuclear arsenal for decades, the continuing Israeli possession of nuclear weapons represents a major irritant to Egyptian leaders as well as a source of anger among the Egyptian public. While Mubarak views Tehran with great suspicion and contempt, it is difficult for Cairo to speak out strongly against Tehran's nuclear program due to the ongoing Arab-Israeli crisis and Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. It is not politically sustainable for Cairo to oppose Iran's nuclear program more loudly than it opposes Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, even though the Egyptian regime may view the Israeli nuclear weapons as a defensive deterrent of last resort. In fact, some reporting has suggested that some Egyptian leaders view the Iranian nuclear program as an opportunity to place pressure on Israel to relinquish its nuclear weapons and sign the NPT. However, more thoughtful Egyptians recognize that the apparent Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons makes any Israeli concession on its purported nuclear weapons next to impossible.

EGYPT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, if Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons in the coming years, it would place significant pressure on Egypt to follow suit. To assess the likely Egyptian response to Iranian nuclear weapons, it is helpful to catalog the incentives and disincentives that would influence the Egyptian decision. In terms of incentives, if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the leading motivation for an Egyptian pursuit of nuclear weapons would not necessarily be a fear of Iran, but rather a fear of marginalization. An Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would tempt Egypt to follow suit in order to reclaim and maintain Egypt's traditional role as regional power and reassert its position as leader of the Arab world. Egyptians would view a nuclear armed Iran as a threat to Egypt's power and influence in the region. In other words, an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would shift the balance of power away from Egypt and toward Iran. Many Egyptians would undoubtedly conclude that Egyptian possession of its own nuclear weapons would most effectively redress the balance of power. As discussed below, these Egyptian motivations would be greatly magnified if Saudi Arabia responded to an Iranian bomb by pursuing one as well.

As powerful as these incentives would be, the disincentives appear greater. Two pillars undergird Egyptian national security strategy: peace with Israel and a security partnership with the United States. While both Israel and America remain very unpopu-

⁴This report does not take a position on the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons.

lar with the Egyptian people, the Egyptian regime relies on peace with Israel and aid from the United States to maintain its security and its power. An Egyptian pursuit of nuclear weapons would destabilize—if not topple—the Israeli and American pillars of Egypt’s national security strategy. Egyptian leaders considering a pursuit of nuclear weapons would need to consider the Israeli response. In the past, Egypt has had difficulty concealing and protecting its nuclear activities from Israeli surveillance and intervention. There is no reason to believe a new Egyptian nuclear weapons program would evade Israeli attention. Such an Egyptian program and the Israeli response could reignite open hostility between the two states. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, an Egyptian nuclear weapons program could severely damage the bilateral relationship between Egypt and the United States. Egypt leans heavily on U.S. aid, as well as U.S. military assistance, and an Egyptian nuclear weapons program would endanger both. Therefore, as long as peace with Israel and a security relationship with the United States remain in Egypt’s interest, the disincentives for an Egyptian nuclear weapons program appear to outweigh the incentives.

As important as the relationship with the United States remains to the Egyptian regime, the United States would be wise to not take this bilateral relationship for granted. The current relationship between Egypt and the United States has seen better days. Mubarak and other Egyptian leaders have uncharacteristically lashed out at the United States in recent years.⁵ Mubarak and the inner-circle of Egyptian decisionmakers have expressed deep frustration with U.S. policy. The Egyptians believe the United States has behaved rashly and incompetently in Iraq and has served as a destabilizing influence in the region. They also resent the conditioning of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) on democratic reform and public statements from high-level officials condemning the humanitarian track record of the Mubarak government. The Egyptians see the Middle East as unstable, placing much of the blame on the United States. Referring to the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, one Egyptian official said, “wars are coming closer and becoming more numerous.”

The Egyptians also bemoan America’s unwillingness to press the Israelis to achieve a two-state solution with the Palestinians. In fact, the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian crisis at its foundation—represent the Egyptian regime’s central strategic liability. The Egyptian regime’s unpopularity at home and its inability to lead Arabs abroad derives to a large extent from Egypt’s peace with Israel and its alignment with the United States—the two countries blamed by Arabs for the ongoing suffering of the Palestinian people. Thus, Egypt’s association with Israel and the United States—combined with the ongoing Palestinian crisis for which they take blame—weakens the Egyptian regime’s domestic credibility and undercuts Egypt’s attempt to regain its traditional role as leader of the Arab world.

⁵Michael Slackman, “Egypt, Under Stress, Sees United States as Pain and Remedy,” *New York Times* (Oct. 22, 2006).

As identified above, an Iranian nuclear weapon—and certainly a Saudi nuclear weapon—would further reduce Egypt's regional power and influence. The desire to regain this power and influence would represent the most important incentive for a prospective Egyptian nuclear weapons program. If the United States seeks to increase the domestic credibility and the regional influence of the Egyptian Government so as to reduce the likelihood of an eventual Egyptian decision to pursue nuclear weapons, a durable two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians would represent one of the most effective means to accomplish this objective.

THE TWO WILD CARDS

If the preceding analysis is correct, in the event of an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, Egypt would be tempted to pursue nuclear weapons, but most likely, Egypt would ultimately decide against it because the costs would outweigh the benefits. However, there are two variables that could substantially shift this cost-benefit analysis and possibly result in an Egyptian decision to pursue nuclear weapons. The Israeli response to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons represents the first variable. If Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon in the next few years, this would represent a major strategic and political shock to Israel. As a result, the Israeli Government would face tremendous domestic political pressure to respond in an explicit and bold way. Staff envisions two possible Israeli responses related to Israel's purported possession of nuclear weapons. The first would consist of an explicit acknowledgement of Israel's nuclear weapons and an unambiguous warning that Israel would respond to any Iranian nuclear attack—or a nuclear attack from an Iranian proxy—with a devastating nuclear counterattack. This Israeli response would directly state that an Iranian nuclear attack would result in the destruction of Iran. The second possible response would make it clear that an Iranian nuclear attack would result in the destruction of Iran, without explicitly acknowledging Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. A response along these lines might say: "Iran should not entertain any doubt as to how Israel would respond to a nuclear attack by Iran or any of its proxies. If Iran or any of its proxies use nuclear weapons against Israel, Israel will respond with all weapons in its arsenal to ensure that Iran could never conduct such an attack again." In short, the first response would acknowledge Israel's nuclear weapons, whereas the second would not.

In the event of an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the character of the Israeli response will have an important influence on Egypt's nuclear weapons decision. The first response, which consists of an explicit acknowledgment of Israel's nuclear weapons capability, would be more emotionally satisfying to many Israelis and would satisfy the short-term domestic political pressure within Israel. However, such an explicit public statement by the Israeli Government would place tremendous political pressure on the Egyptian regime to respond in some tangible way. Admittedly, an Israeli announcement regarding nuclear weapons would not represent a major revelation for regional governments, but it would create a groundswell of Egyptian public protest, demanding a tangible response from the Egyptian Government. The most con-

sequential options for an Egyptian response include a renunciation of its peace treaty with Israel, a repudiation of its relations with the United States, or the initiation of an Egyptian nuclear weapons program. As a leading nonproliferation scholar told staff, "If the Israelis declared [their nuclear weapons], Egypt would have to react. I am not sure how, but Egypt would be forced to react." However, if Israel responds more prudently to an Iranian nuclear weapon, Israel can convey the necessary message to Tehran without inciting a strong Egyptian response. Therefore, if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the United States would be wise to strongly encourage Israel to respond in a prudent and measured manner that does not make a bad situation worse.

A Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons, as discussed in Chapter 4, would represent the second variable that could substantially shift Egypt's cost-benefit analysis regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Such a development would have a major impact on Cairo and could likely result in an Egyptian decision to pursue nuclear weapons. To appreciate why such a development would jar Egyptian decisionmaking, one must understand Egypt's self conception in the Arab world, and the associated rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

While other Arabs frequently scoff at the notion, Egyptians see themselves as the natural leaders of the Arab world, based largely on Egypt's proud history, its dominance of Arab culture and media, its large population, and its relative military prowess. However, staff frequently encountered a feeling among Egyptian officials and scholars that Egypt's leadership role has deteriorated in recent years. One high level Egyptian official echoed this common theme saying, "Egypt needs to restore its standing." He suggested that Egypt's prestige and leadership role in the region was "great 50 years ago, but not so much now."

Egyptians view Saudi Arabia as the country attempting to replace Egypt as the leader of the Arab world. While Saudi Arabia has only one-third of Egypt's population, Saudi Arabia's oil wealth and its role as "guardian of the two holy mosques" gives it a unique position from which to challenge Egypt's leadership. From the point of view of many Egyptians, the February 2007 Saudi-brokered Mecca Conference between Hamas and Fatah provided the most recent symbol of Saudi Arabia's ascendance and Egypt's decline as the leader of the Arab world. While this "Mecca deal" ultimately fell apart, many Egyptians view the Saudi role as one that Cairo should have been playing instead. More generally, from the perspective of Egyptian mid-level and senior leaders, the desire to reclaim Egypt's leadership role in the Arab world remains acute, and Saudi Arabia represents the leading challenger to this "rightful" Egyptian role.

In addition to this Egyptian view of Saudi Arabia as rival for leadership of the Arab world, many Egyptian leaders also view Saudi Arabia's influence as largely negative. The secular Egyptian regime resents the role Saudi Arabia has played in promoting Islamist radicalism. When staff asked a high-level Egyptian official about Iranian influence, he responded by claiming that Saudi Arabian influence was "vastly more negative" than that of Iran, referring to the Saudi roots of al-Qaeda. (A claim that is not entirely

fair given the role of Egyptians in al-Qaeda as well). In short, many Egyptian leaders view Saudi Arabia as a competitor for leadership of the Arab world and some also see Saudi Arabia largely as a negative influence in the region and within Egypt.

Within this context of competition between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a uniquely threatening challenge to Egypt's self-conception and regional influence. As already discussed, Egypt would view an Iranian bomb as a negative and disconcerting development. However, in the end, Iran does not represent an Arab or Sunni power. Thus, despite Tehran's efforts to blur ethnic and religious differences, it is unlikely that Iran will ever be able to unify Sunni Arab powers beneath its leadership. The same can not be said of the Saudis. The Saudis are Arab and they are predominantly Sunni, and in sharing these two important characteristics with Egypt, a Saudi nuclear bomb would represent a more proximate and more serious threat to Egypt's prestige and national identity. In short, the manner with which Israel and Saudi Arabia respond to the potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons will have a potentially decisive influence on Egypt's decision regarding nuclear weapons. Therefore, in addition to working to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, U.S. decisionmakers must look "a few moves ahead in the chess game" to ensure that decisions in Tel Aviv and Riyadh do not lead to a nuclear weapons decision in Cairo.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

- *Impact of a Two-State Solution.* The Arab popular and governmental response to Iran's nuclear program has been, for the most part, remarkably subdued. Given the existence of long-term rivalry and suspicion between Arabs and Persians, as well as the existence of Sunni and Shia tensions, one might have expected a more unified and robust Arab response to Iranian nuclear ambitions. Several reasons motivate this muted Arab response, but the primary reason is the ongoing Arab-Israeli crisis. The purported existence of Israeli nuclear weapons, as well as the fact that Tehran has shrewdly positioned itself as one of the most outspoken critics of Israel and defenders of the Palestinians, creates sympathy among Arab publics for the Iranian nuclear program. Much of the "Arab street" sees an Iranian nuclear weapon as a welcome counterbalance to Israel and a way to "poke a stick in the eye" of the United States and Israel. Staff found this Arab sentiment in all six Arab countries visited. Contrary to this popular Arab sentiment, short of an existential crisis, Arab governments do not expect the Israeli government to use its nuclear weapons. This difference between popular and governmental perspectives in the Arab world largely explains the muted Arab response to the Iranian nuclear program. An ongoing Arab-Israeli crisis will decisively undercut any U.S. effort to create a unified regional front against Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. The United States should work aggressively to develop a durable two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. Such an outcome would enable the United States to construct a unified regional front against Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. A

endurable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis would also increase the Egyptian regime's domestic credibility and its regional prestige, thereby reducing the need for Egypt to respond to an Iranian bomb by pursuing one of their own.

- *Reiterate U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Weapons.* The United States should remove any Egyptian confusion regarding U.S. policy and attitudes toward nuclear weapons proliferation. Traditional U.S. policy toward nuclear weapons proliferation essentially stated that no nuclear proliferation was acceptable or desirable. However, in recent years, some U.S. Government statements and policies have encouraged an international perception that the United States views some nuclear weapons proliferation as acceptable or even desirable and other nuclear proliferation as unacceptable. In other words, nuclear proliferation among America's friends is tolerable, while proliferation among America's prospective enemies is intolerable. The degree to which friends of the United States subscribe to this notion, the likelihood of nuclear proliferation among America's friends will increase. The United States should privately reiterate in an unambiguous manner that an Egyptian nuclear weapons program would severely damage relations with the United States.
- *Cooperate With the Egyptians on Nuclear Energy.* As previously stated, from a security and counterterrorism perspective, a Middle East devoid of nuclear power plants is preferable to a Middle East populated by a number of nuclear power plants. However, if the governments of the region pursue nuclear power, the United States can do little to stop them. If the United States and U.S. companies do not work with the states of the Middle East in developing their nuclear program, other countries will step in to take America's place. If countries such as Egypt decide to pursue nuclear energy, the United States and U.S. companies should be first in line to help them. By having American nuclear energy companies—instead of Russian, French, or Chinese companies—working with the Egyptians, the United States accrues several advantages. First, the U.S. Government can work with U.S. companies to ensure the Egyptian nuclear power plants incorporate the best safeguards possible. Second, the involvement of U.S. companies provides the U.S. Government a degree of indirect oversight that helps ensure a peaceful nuclear program remains that way. Finally, the involvement of U.S. companies represents another way to solidify the bilateral relationship with a country that controls the strategically vital Suez Canal.
- *Mind the Succession.* Mubarak, who is almost 80 years old, appears to strongly oppose nuclear weapons, yet it is not clear how much longer he will be in power. While Mubarak served as Sadat's Vice President, rising to the Presidency after Sadat's assassination, Mubarak has not selected a Vice President. This vacancy suggests that Mubarak may be positioning his son, Gamal, to assume power after his death. Little is known regarding Gamal's attitudes toward nuclear weapons or whether the Egyptian elite would accept Gamal as the next President

of Egypt. The Egyptian Government's opposition to weapons of mass destruction may simply reflect Mubarak's personal beliefs. In the next decade, it is likely that Egypt will have a new ruler, and it is unclear whether this ruler will share Mubarak's apparent aversion to weapons of mass destruction. The United States should monitor this succession carefully, fully aware that Egypt's policies regarding nuclear weapons could change overnight based on a change of leadership in Cairo.

CHAPTER 5: TURKEY

A brief survey of relations between Turkey and Iran will help U.S. decisionmakers understand how Turkey might respond to a nuclear-armed Iran. Turkey and Iran enjoy a relatively stable yet complex relationship. Turkey views Iran as both strategic competitor and economic partner. The countries do not view each other as enemies, yet there exists a significant degree of Turkish suspicion regarding Iran's regional intentions. Turkish military officers describe the border with Iran as Turkey's "quietest border," yet most Turkish leaders and political officers harbor a notable degree of distrust regarding Iran's nuclear program. Turkey disapproves of Iran's support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Iraq, yet Turkey and Iran share a common concern regarding Kurdish extremists (PKK and PJAK) in the north of Iraq and Iran, respectively. The Turks (and the predecessor Ottoman Empire) have enjoyed a stable and undefended border with Iran since the 1600s, yet many Turks voice concern regarding Iran's expanding influence. Turkey and Iran have not fought a war with each other in centuries, yet Turks complain about Iranian attempts to establish Sharia law in the secular Turkish state after the Islamic Revolution.

To complicate this multifaceted relationship with Iran, Turkey occupies a precarious geographic, political, and economic position between Iran and the West. Turkey—a NATO member—attempts to maintain the trust of its security partners in Europe and the United States, while promoting stable relations and economic trade with Iran. Turkey seeks to honor U.N. Security Council Resolutions and the associated sanctions against Iran, while not alienating its neighbor and one of its most important economic partners.

Honoring international sanctions against Iran presents difficulties for Turkey due to the significant economic relationship between the two countries as well as Turkey's need for Iranian oil and natural gas. After Russia, Iran serves as the second leading natural gas supplier to Turkey. This Turkish dependence on Iranian gas will most likely continue to grow. Turkey views Russia as an unreliable energy supplier and believes it will need to increase its energy imports from Iran in order to decrease its energy dependence on Russia. As part of this effort, Turkey concluded a \$23 billion natural gas deal with Iran in 1996 and recently agreed to two additional energy deals with Iran. These deals will allow the Turkish Petroleum Corporation to develop oil and natural gas in Iran and permit Turkmenistan to pipe gas through Iran and Turkey to Europe.¹

Regarding Iran's nuclear program, Ankara believes a nuclear-armed Iran would represent a negative development for Turkey

¹ F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* (Jul./Aug. 2007)

and the wider region. Turkish officials and scholars consistently label a nuclear-armed Iran a “threat,” but regional actors or leaders do not view a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential or military threat. All Turks interviewed believe that Turkey would not be the target of a nuclear Iran. By this, the Turks mean they do not envision an Iranian nuclear or conventional military attack based on an Iranian possession of nuclear weapons. However, the Turks interviewed unanimously expressed a concern that an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would dramatically shift the balance of power between the two countries, resulting in a more assertive Iranian role in the region.

However, these Turkish commentators do not view Iran with the same sense of urgency as the Bush administration—a difference the 2007 Iran NIE will likely exacerbate. The report’s declaration that Iran had ended its nuclear weapons program in 2003, as well as its prediction that Iran probably would not have the HEU necessary for nuclear weapons before 2010–15, further depleted any sense of Turkish urgency regarding Iranian nuclear weapons. The NIE has allowed Turkish leaders to collectively exhale. Furthermore, especially after the NIE, Turkey does not even see the Iranian nuclear program as its leading foreign policy concern, but instead views it as a distant and somewhat abstract threat. In contrast, Turkey views the PKK violence and Kurdish separatism as immediate and tangible threats.

One impact of Iran’s nuclear program has been to catalyze Turkey’s nuclear energy development efforts. Turkey is moving aggressively toward the development of domestic nuclear power generation, but nuclear power plants will probably not come on line before 2015. Much of Turkey’s move toward nuclear energy appears to be driven by legitimate energy needs, but Turkey also seeks to match Iran’s nuclear progress and to ensure future flexibility that will allow adaptation to Iran’s actions. In the past, when the government has made initial moves toward nuclear energy it has sparked strong domestic opposition. As one Turk put it, “Politically speaking, it hasn’t been possible to go ahead so far, but now because of Iran, the nuclear energy option is on the table.” In effect, the Iranian nuclear program has strengthened the position of nuclear energy advocates in Turkey. While significant popular opposition to nuclear energy still exists in Turkey due primarily to environmental concerns, the government seems determined to move forward in its development of a nuclear energy program. As a result of these developments, if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold in 5 to 10 years, Turkey will already have a significantly stronger technological foundation should it choose to pursue a nuclear weapons capability.

MAJOR IRRITANTS IN THE UNITED STATES-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP

Prior to President Bush’s November 2007 meetings with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and January 2008 meetings with Turkish President Abdullah Gul, Turkish-United States relations were at one of the lowest points in memory. Two major irritants have exacerbated the strain in the bilateral relationship originally caused by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq: PKK and Kurdish separatism and the Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR). U.S. failure

to address these irritants could ultimately undercut Turkish perceptions of the utility of the bilateral relationship with the United States.

Turkey's perception of the reliability of the NATO and U.S. security guarantees will play a decisive role in Turkey's response to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would dramatically and historically shift the balance of power between Turkey and Iran. Turkey's two major options would include a reliance on U.S. and NATO security guarantees or the development of a Turkish nuclear weapon to balance Iran. To the degree that the two irritants degrade Turkish perceptions of its relations with the United States and the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee, they will have an indirect but significant impact on Turkey's nuclear weapons decision. Therefore, these two irritants to the bilateral relationship require additional analysis.

Overwhelmingly, in meeting after meeting, Turkish officials and scholars expressed sincere distress regarding PKK violence and Kurdish separatism. The PKK has conducted periodic terrorist attacks against Turkey, killing more than 1,500 Turks since 2004.² While the PKK represents an immediate and tangible concern to Turkey, the deeper Turkish anxiety relates to Kurdish separatism. Most Turks fear that an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq might evolve into a "Kurdistan" that would subsume much of southeast Turkey where a large number of Kurds reside. Several individuals interviewed expressed an apparently widespread concern that Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani—despite their statements to the contrary—view the current Kurdish semi-autonomous region in northern Iraq as a temporary stepping stone to establishment of a "Kurdistan." The recent foreign oil contracts signed by the Kurdish regional authority, as opposed to the central government in Baghdad, confirmed the fears of many Turks. When Baghdad chastised the Kurdish regional authority for bypassing the central government, the Kurdish oil minister responded by calling for the resignation of the Oil Minister in Baghdad.³ From the perspective of many Turks, this incident confirmed their fears regarding Kurdish separatism. Some Turks also expressed the view that Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its associated oil resources provide evidence of a Kurdish desire to move toward the establishment of a "Kurdistan."

A "Kurdistan" that encompasses the bulk of the Kurdish population in the region would extract large chunks of territory from Iran, Turkey, and Syria. For this reason, Turkey has been working with both Iran and Syria to address problems related to violent Kurdish separatists. In fact, from the Turkish perspective, Iranian cooperation against the PKK served as a contrast to the perceived U.S. unwillingness to act against the PKK prior to Bush's meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister.

²Soner Caqaptay and Mark Dubowitz, "A Deadly Stumbling Block Named PKK," *Financial Times Deutschland* (Feb. 26, 2007) <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1034>.

³"Iraqi Kurds Demand Oil Minister's Resignation," AFP (Sep. 13, 2007) <http://afp.google.com/article/ALegM5haNFkil4-1s66QF0qB1tHMg-RoWQ>.

Not only are PKK violence and Kurdish separatism the leading perceived threats to Turkey, but they represent the greatest source of friction in the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the United States. One official in Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told staff, "The PKK is like a snake in our bilateral relationship." Turkey opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and refused U.S. requests to send U.S. forces through Turkey largely out of fear that a U.S. attack could lead to instability and Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq, a prediction most Turks believe has been fulfilled. While the Kurdish north has enjoyed relative stability, the U.S. invasion has given a historic impetus to Kurdish separatism. Prior to November 2007, the lack of U.S. action against PKK forces in northern Iraq infuriated many Turks and caused "deep disappointment." The United States asked Turkey not to intervene in any major way in northern Iraq. From Turkey's perspective, Turkey agreed to abstain from large-scale intervention in northern Iraq, and in return, the United States would address the PKK threat. Turks widely believe the United States did not hold up its end. This lack of U.S. action against PKK has led to rampant conspiracy theories regarding alleged U.S.-PKK cooperation and has contributed to high levels of anti-Americanism in Turkey. A Pew Global Attitudes Project survey released in September 2007 said only 9 percent of Turks have a positive view of the United States. These anti-U.S. conspiracies have contributed to the popularity of a television series and associated movie in Turkey entitled "Valley of the Wolves," that features U.S. atrocities and intrigue in northern Iraq. In fact, Many average Turks believe the United States has armed the PKK in an effort to undermine the regime in Tehran.

Since the November 5 meeting between Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and President Bush, the U.S. commitment to share PKK intelligence with Turkey and to take tangible steps against the PKK have significantly ameliorated the crisis in United States-Turkish relations. In meetings with Turkish Parliamentarians and with think tank scholars, Turks expressed great satisfaction with the U.S. declaration of the PKK as "a common enemy" and also approved of the steps the United States has taken to help Turkey confront the PKK. However, most Turks have taken a "wait and see" approach and it will take significant reduction in the PKK threat and a significant amount of time for United States-Turkish relations to heal.

While PKK violence and Kurdish separatism represent the greatest irritants in the United States-Turkey relationship by far, the Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) has also damaged United States-Turkey relations. The introduction of an AGR in the U.S. House of Representatives inflamed Turkish political and public opinion. In October 2007, a House committee passed the non-binding resolution declaring the 1915 killings, which occurred in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire, to be genocide. If the full House passed the resolution, the Turkish military chief, General Yasar Buyukanit, warned "our military relations with the United States can never be the same." He continued, "The U.S. shot its own foot." Two days earlier, the Prime Minister Erdogan cautioned that bilateral relations with the United States were endangered and recalled the Turkish Ambassador from Washington. Last year,

in response to French passage of a similar resolution, Turkey halted all military cooperation with France.⁴ While this AGR crisis has receded, any future effort to pass an Armenian genocide resolution would incite a similar Turkish response and would damage the important bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey. During meetings, staff was warned that a future AGR would result in tangible Turkish steps against the United States, possibly including the exclusion of U.S. energy companies from the participation in future Turkish nuclear energy industry.

TURKEY AND NATO

Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952 and has since served as a strong member of the alliance since. In fact, Turkey represents NATO's second largest military force, and Turkey has contributed significantly to NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Turkey has commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan twice and has established a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The Turkish Government believes that it has more than upheld its commitments as a NATO member. However, numerous individuals interviewed by staff expressed a dissatisfaction with NATO and a feeling that Turkey has given more to NATO than NATO has provided to Turkey.

Two events have served to undermine Turkey's perception of the reliability of NATO in protecting Turkey's national security. The first incident occurred in 1991. An inaccurate, yet widespread, view exists that NATO failed to honor its Article V commitments to Turkey in 1991 during the Persian Gulf war. Many Turks—even educated Turks and some government officials—believe that Turkey requested help from NATO and that assistance never came or was slow in arriving. In reality, NATO ended up deploying military forces to protect Turkey.

In February 2003, just prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Turkey initiated consultations with NATO under the authority of the treaty. These consultations initially took place in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This forum, which includes France, did not respond to Turkey's concerns. Consequently, the deliberations were moved to the Defense Planning Council (DPC), which does not include France, and Turkey ultimately received support from NATO. While the NATO flag and NATO forces ultimately deployed to Turkey, most Turks only remember the initial rejection of their requests. According to one Turkish government official, these events in 1991 and 2003 sent the message that Turkey was “not a member of this [NATO] family.”

In reality, the poor view of NATO common in Turkey is really directed at specific members of the NATO alliance that have consistently opposed Turkish requests within the context of NATO, with much of Turkish ire directed at France. If France fully reintegrates itself into NATO as some anticipate, this will further negatively impact Turkey's perceptions regarding NATO's reliability.

⁴Brian Knowlton, “U.S. House Speaker Vows Debate on Armenian Genocide Resolution,” *International Herald Tribune* (October 14, 2007). <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2007/10/14/news/turkey.php?page=1>.

Turkey also fears that NATO's reliability and Turkey's security are being undermined by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since Turkey is not a member of the European Union (EU), Turkey feels threatened by any shift in the locus of European defense planning and capabilities from NATO to the EU. To the degree that this shift continues to occur—or is perceived by the Turks to occur—it will promote a sense of insecurity and dislocation from its Western security partners that will increase the chances that Turkey would respond to an Iranian nuclear weapon acquisition by pursuing one of its own.

While staff heard numerous concerns regarding NATO, it is important to place this finding in context. Undoubtedly, Turkish perceptions regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of NATO have declined. Interestingly, junior and middle rank military officers and politicians who came of age after the cold war, and who are not old enough to remember NATO's apex during that period tend to have less faith in NATO's loyalty. But this cohort does recall the 1991 and 2003 incidents in which Turks perceived NATO as failing to honor its commitments. However, Turkey's membership in NATO and the security assurances that accompany that membership remain the core of Turkish national security strategy; senior political and military leaders in Turkey fully appreciate this fact. As today's junior and mid-level politicians and military leaders move into positions of senior leadership in Turkey, they will increasingly appreciate the central role of NATO in Turkish security. However, it seems clear that the next generation of leaders in Turkey will be more nationalist and less trusting of NATO than the previous generation, a change that may have a significant impact on a Turkish decision regarding nuclear weapons.

TURKEY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this will place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit. Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but Turkey believes the centuries of relative peace between the two states derives primarily from the rough balance of power between them. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance of power in Iran's direction. Turkey believes this increased Iranian power would lead to a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy and a marginalization of Turkey. Such a development would significantly undercut Turkey's desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west. In such a scenario, there would be strong voices in the Turkish General Staff, as well as among ultra-nationalist politicians, arguing for Turkey to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the possibility still exists that Turkey would respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well.

At the same time, there are significant disincentives to a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. First, a Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons would severely damage United States-Turkish relations, which represent an essential component of Turkish national security. Second, such a development would endanger Turkey's good standing in NATO, another key component of Turkey's national security. Third, a Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons probably would eliminate any remaining chance of Turk-

ish accession into the European Union. Fourth, powerful popular voices within Turkey would likely oppose a Turkish attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the democratic system in Turkey would enable these popular forces to influence Turkey's decisions on these issues.

In a closed door meeting, staff asked a group of influential Turkish politicians how Turkey would respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. These politicians emphatically responded that Turkey would pursue nuclear weapons as well. These individuals stated, "Turkey would lose its importance in the region if Iran has nuclear weapons and Turkey does not." Another politician said it would be "compulsory" for Turkey to obtain nuclear weapons in such a scenario. However, when staff subsequently asked whether a U.S. nuclear umbrella and robust security commitment would be sufficient to dissuade Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons, all three individuals agreed that it would.

Based on meetings with Turkish officials and U.S. Embassy personnel in Ankara, staff believes the state of United States-Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of NATO will serve as the decisive factors in Turkey's decision regarding nuclear weapons. If the bilateral relationship with the United States is strained and Turkey's trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more likely to respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well. However, a restored bilateral relationship with the United States and a restored Turkish trust in NATO could decisively discourage Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons. The United States and NATO would need to take tangible steps to reassure and secure Turkey, but a healthy Turkish relationship with the United States and NATO provides the best means to discourage a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The United States should not wait until Iran crosses the nuclear threshold before seeking to influence Turkey's nuclear decision-making, and would be wise to take steps now to restore the bilateral relationship with Turkey. The following policy considerations would help accomplish both of these objectives:

- *Take a Firm Stance on the PKK.* As the Bush administration stated in November 2007, the PKK represents a "common enemy" of the United States and Turkey. The PKK has killed many Turks over the years and is currently listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Government. Perceived U.S. inaction regarding the PKK over the last 4 years has fueled anti-Americanism in Turkey. As General Joseph Ralston, the Special Envoy for Countering the Kurdistan Worker's Party, testified before a House committee, "I have no doubt that if we can significantly reduce the PKK threat to Turkey that it will do much to improve the state of relations between the United States and Turkey."⁵

⁵ General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Ret.), Special Envoy Countering the Kurdistan Worker's Party, "U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead," Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Europe (Washington, DC, Mar. 15, 2007)

- *Understand the Policy Implications of the Establishment of a Sovereign Kurdish State.* While the federal structure in Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Authority probably represents the best possible political structure for Iraq, some Kurds may seek to establish a sovereign and independent state in northern Iraq. A state of this kind—especially one seeking to subsume Kurdish-dominated territory in Turkey—would represent an existential threat for the Turkish state. Any effort to break away from Iraq and certainly any effort to subsume parts of adjacent states into a larger “Kurdistan” would be a *casus belli* for Turkey.
- *Understand the Implications of U.S. Iraq Policy for Relations With Turkey.* The outcome of the U.S. intervention in Iraq will dramatically impact Turkish security, as well as Turkey’s perception of the U.S. security guarantee. Instability in Iraq would likely threaten the Turkmen population in Iraq, could lead to heightened strife or even civil war between Shia and Sunni, could increase violence in northern Iraq, and could lead to heightened autonomy or even statehood for Iraq’s Kurds. In addition, for centuries, modern day Iraq has served as the “chess board” for Ottoman and Persian competition. Instability in Iraq could reignite this competition in Iraq, with the Turks backing the Sunnis and the Iranians backing the Shia. All of these developments would represent serious concerns or even existential threats for Turkey. These developments would possibly compel Turkish intervention in Iraq, dramatically undermining Turkish security, severely damaging United States-Turkey bilateral relations, and dangerously diminishing the Turkish trust in the U.S. security guarantee.
- *Consider the Ramifications of Future Armenian Genocide Resolutions.* Future attempts to pass an AGR could significantly damage United States-Turkey bilateral relations, promoting a political estrangement that could impact Turkish perceptions of the U.S. security guarantee. Such a development could ultimately affect Turkey’s eventual decision regarding nuclear weapons. This is not to suggest the United States should wash its hands of all principled concerns regarding the Armenian Genocide. However, decisionmakers must recognize that a resolution passed by Congress may not be the best way to honor American values and interests.
- *Address Turkey’s Missile Defense Concerns.* In light of Iran’s continued development of ballistic missiles that can strike all of Turkey, as well as the prospect of an eventual Iranian nuclear weapon, Turkey has some legitimate missile defense concerns. Turkey has expressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that the current U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe would exclude Turkey. While recent events might persuade Turkey to interpret this as a deliberate U.S. slight, the U.S. decision to exclude Turkey is based on physics. Turkey is too close to Iran for the proposed missile defense system to work. However, the United States should not simply state this fact and move on, but instead should work with Ankara to develop alternative means to provide Turkey the missile defense systems nec-

essary to protect itself. Turkey continues to work with U.S. companies to design such a solution. The U.S. Government should remove unnecessary obstacles to the speedy development of a missile defense system that addresses Turkey's needs.

- *Support Turkey's Effort to Join the European Union (EU).* The United States does not have a direct or leading role in this EU decision. However, whatever influence the United States does wield should be utilized to support Turkey's accession effort. The more Turkey feels integrated into the West and protected by Western political and security institutions, the less likely Turkey would be to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.

If Turks become convinced that the EU accession process will never result in EU membership, they will feel more estranged and excluded from the West. Such dislocation from the West will promote ultra-nationalism in Turkey, as well as a desire to become less reliant on the West by becoming more militarily self-sufficient. Such a development would serve as a powerful impetus for the development of a Turkish nuclear weapon in the coming decade or two. In terms of timing, given that the EU accession process will likely take years, some say it will be irrelevant to Turkey's response to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, the December 2007 NIE predicted that Iran would probably not have a nuclear weapons capability until 2010–15. If this judgment is "in the ballpark," the EU decision and Turkey's response to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons may be more proximate to one another than some expect.

Further perceived drift in the locus of the European defense regime from NATO to the EU would be of concern to Turkey. To the degree that this occurs without Turkey's membership in the EU, Turkey will be excluded from European defense planning and cooperation. If NATO recedes in perceived importance or value, and the center of gravity of European defense shifts toward the EU, a Turkey that is not an EU member will view itself as increasingly marginalized and abandoned by its Western allies.

In addition to the role EU membership might play in discouraging Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons, EU membership would also facilitate Turkey's desired role as a mediator between East and West. Turkey, on the one hand, takes pride in its growing economy and its secular Western orientation; on the other hand, Turkey takes pride in its Muslim faith and its amicable relations with most countries of the Middle East. Turkey correctly believes these characteristics—along with Turkey's geography—provide the country with a unique and positive opportunity to have a foot in both "worlds." From a Turkish perspective, rejection by the EU would diminish Turkey's ability to serve as a mediator between East and West and would further increase Turkey's sense of marginalization. Real challenges such as the Cyprus negotiations lie ahead and Turkey still needs to undertake significant reforms. However, the status of Turkey's EU accession efforts will serve as one of a

few potentially decisive factors in shaping how Turkey would respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons.

APPENDIX 1

STATUS OF RELEVANT NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS

Country	NPT ¹	IAEA SGA ²	IAEA AP ³	CTBT ⁴	CPPNM ⁵	CPPNM Amd	SQP ⁶	CENNA ⁷	CACNARE ⁸	CNS ⁹	SFM ¹⁰
Bahrain	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Egypt	Y	Y	N	Signed	N	N	N	Y	Y	Signed	N
Iran	Y	Y	Signed	Signed	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Iraq	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Israel	N	Y	N	Signed	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Signed	N
Jordan	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Signed	N
Kuwait	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Lebanon	Y	Y	N	Signed	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed
Oman	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Qatar	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Saudi	Y	Signed	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Syria	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Signed	Signed	Signed	N
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
UAE	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Yemen	Y	Y	N	Signed	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N

Prepared by CRS with data from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

Key: Y - State is a party to the agreement.
N - State is not a party to the agreement.
Signed - State has signed, but not ratified, the agreement.

¹ Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

² International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement. All non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT are required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Israel is not a party to the NPT but does have a facility-specific safeguards agreement for a nuclear research reactor.

³ Additional Protocol to IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Such protocols give the IAEA additional authority to investigate a state's nuclear activities.

⁴ Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Not yet in force.

⁵ Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.


⁶ Small Quantities Protocol. Some NPT state-parties with small quantities of fissionable materials have concluded a small quantities protocol to their IAEA safeguards agreements. Certain IAEA verification requirements are suspended for such states, but the agency's Board of Governors in 2005 approved changes that were designed to bolster verification obligations under the protocol. None of the states listed here with Small Quantities Protocols have accepted the modified text.


⁷ Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

⁸ Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

⁹ Convention on Nuclear Safety.

¹⁰ Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.





APPENDIX 4



Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (12/2007)

MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST



MAP OF ARABIAN PENINSULA AND VICINITY

